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I see him there,
Bringing a stone grasped firmly by the top
In each hand, like an old-stone savage armed.
He moves in darkness as it seems to me,
Not of woods only and the shade of trees.
He will not go behind his father’s saying,
And he likes having thought of it so well
He says again, “Good fences make good neighbors.”1
INTRODUCTION

Robert Frost’s famous poem Mending Wall has been interpreted by one contemporary copyright scholar to mean that a
“hard-headed notion” of “protecting property rights would not
necessarily make a community awash with vibrancy, exuberance and coherence” and that “those who are zealous in building good fences would sadly ‘mov[e] in darkness,’” as admonished by the poet.2 A different, perhaps more neutral reading of
the work, is offered by theologian Caroline A. Westerhoff, who
writes rather fondly of fences or boundaries as follows:
A boundary is a line drawn; it is a line that defines and establishes
identity. All that is within the circumscription of that line makes up a
whole—an “entity.” Neither “good” nor “bad” in its own right, a
boundary determines something that can be pointed to and named . .
. . A boundary provides essential limit, for what is not limited—
bounded—blends into its context and ceases to exist in its own particular way.3

Westerhoff speaks of the importance of drawing lines
around boundaries—a lesson that is learned early in life

1. ROBERT FROST, Mending Wall, in THE POETRY OF ROBERT FROST 33,
34 (Edward Connery Lathem ed., 1969).
2. See, Haochen Sun, Overcoming the Achilles Heel of Copyright Law, 5
NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 265, 329 (2007) (quoting FROST, supra note 1, at
34).
3. CAROLINE A. WESTERHOFF, GOOD FENCES: THE BOUNDARIES OF
HOSPITALITY 13–14 (2004).

5 REILLY FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

GOOD FENCES

2/27/2012 1:46 PM

155

through the games we play in childhood.4 Games such as hopscotch or football utilize lines and borders to teach “indelible
lessons of ordering and limit, of consequence and decorum; lessons of success and failure” where succeeding “meant jumping
through those lines without landing in forbidden territory.”5
One can argue that the necessity of delineating boundaries
around intellectual property rights is even more exigent than
for real property rights, because people generally have less familiarity with the concept of intellectual property ownership
than they do with the concept of private ownership of land.6 “By
drawing lines around protected and unprotected [intellectual
property] subject matter, the law ensures the continued accessibility of areas for others to use and build upon.”7
When viewed in the context of sound recording infringement and digital sampling, two recent high court rulings—one
in the United States and the other in Germany—have determined that good fences do, indeed, make for sensible legal
boundaries with respect to the copyrights held by the owners of
sound recordings.8 While the legal doctrines employed by the
courts in each of these cases are different in letter and theory,
both courts concluded that owners of rights held in sound recordings should reasonably expect the law to protect the valid
4. Id. at 1.
5. Id.
6. EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY
OUTLAWS: HOW SQUATTERS, PIRATES, AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF
OWNERSHIP 40–41 (2010).
7. Id. at 41 (noting how important it is that non-owners of intellectual
property “understand precisely what constitutes the [intellectual] good itself”
so they know what actions they should take to avoid trespassing on the rights
of the owner); see also TERRY L. ANDERSON & PETER J. HILL, THE NOT SO
WILD, WILD WEST: PROPERTY RIGHTS ON THE FRONTIER 206 (2004) (asserting
that “[w]ell-defined and secure property rights for intellectual property are a
key to economic growth in the modern world”). For discussion of an interesting
analogy of providing fences or proper metes and bounds in the area of patent
law, see John Cordani, Note, Patent at Your Own Risk: Linguistic Fences and
Abbott Laboratories v. Sandoz, Inc., 95 CORNELL L. REV. 1221,
1222 (2010) which discusses the “linguistic fence” or the language used by patent applicants to describe the metes and bounds of their inventions in order
to provide meaningful knowledge regarding what exact “intellectual ‘land’”
owned by the patentee is off bounds for use by the public.
8. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films LLC, 410 F.3d 792 (6th
Cir. 2005); Neil Conley & Tom Braegelmann, Metall auf Metall: The Importance of the Kraftwerk Decision for the Sampling of Music in Germany, 56
J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 1017, 1018−19 (2008) (providing the English translation for the German Federal Supreme Court decision in Kraftwerk v. Pelham).
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boundaries of those rights when third parties engage in the
practice of unauthorized digital sampling.9 However, both
courts also ultimately fall short in setting and defining parameters that will provide reasonable guidelines for uses that should
be considered fair or free for musicians who wish to sample.10
This article contains five sections. Section I explores the
historical, technical, and cultural development and progression
of the practice of digital music sampling, revealing how musicians in today’s modern recording studio (or even at home on
their computer) are truly creating sounds that have no legal
bounds. Section II discusses the overarching philosophies that
have influenced the creation of laws enacted by both the United
States and German legislatures to protect sound recordings, focusing on the differences between the property, economic, moral, and entrepreneurial rights components of intellectual property created by musicians and their producers. Section III is a
comparative law observation of the differences between how
United States copyright law doctrines and Germanneighboring-rights law principles support the intellectual property that is contained in the sound recording (the medium in
which digital samples are created). The section examines the
historical treatment of digital sampling cases in both countries,
focusing on the similarities and differences in the U.S. Sixth
Circuit ruling in Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films and
the German Federal Supreme Court ruling in Kraftwerk v. Moses Pelham, officially titled Metall auf Metall by the
Bundesgerichtshof or “BGH,” which is the highest court for
most private law cases in Germany.11 Section IV provides a diagnosis of each holding, specifically challenging the analyses
and application of the defenses available to third-party samplers. Finally, the article concludes in Section V by proposing
that the current laws protecting sound recordings in both the
United States and Germany are in need of a serious overhaul
in light of the continuing and constant technological develop-

9. Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d. at 800−01; Conley & Braegelmann, supra
note 8, at 1018.
10. Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d.at 805; Conley & Braegelmann supra note
8, at 1018.
11. Simon Apel, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films (USA), Metall
auf Metall (Germany) and Digital Sound Sampling—”Bright Line Rules”?, 2
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GEISTIGES EIGENTUM [INTELL. PROP. J.] 331, 341 n.75
(2010).
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ment of music sampling techniques.
I. SOUNDS WITH NO BOUNDS: THE HISTORY OF DIGITAL
SAMPLING
Technically speaking, digital sampling is the electronic
process employed by musicians “in which physical sound waves
are converted into binary digital units and used to recycle
sound fragments originally recorded by other musicians.”12 In
modern practice, when a musician “samples” another musician’s pre-recorded music, he or she uses digital equipment to
literally integrate the prior sounds into a new recording.13 The
manual and analog sampling processes employed by musicians
in the past, which eventually led to the development and use of
digital sampling technology, have woven an interesting and eclectic tale in the pages of music history.14 In the 1950s, artists
“used analog tape machines to cut and loop pre-recorded
sounds from melodies to water droplets, changing their tempo,
direction, and applying various other manipulations.”15 Later,
during the 1960s in Jamaica, disc jockeys would perform live
music in clubs by combining different songs with the use of
turntables, mixers, and microphones.16 In New York during the
1970s, similar technology was employed at block parties where
MCs would use microphones to “hype-up a dancing crowd”
while “DJs would mix records creating seamless transitions between songs to ensure that there was never a dull moment in
the party.”17

12. LAURA LEE STAPLETON, E-COPYRIGHT LAW HANDBOOK §3.07, at 338.4 (Supp. 2003).
13. M. Leah Somoano, Comment, Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension
Films: Has Unlicensed Digital Sampling of Copyrighted Sounds Come to an
End?, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 289, 295–96 (2006).
14. See id. at 296.
15. Reuven Ashtar, Theft, Transformation, and the Need of the Immaterial: A Proposal for a Fair Use Digital Sampling Regime, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. &
TECH. 261, 283 (2009).
16. See id.; see also MICHAEL ERIC DYSON, THE MICHAEL ERIC DYSON
READER 426 (2004) (“[T]he Jamaican dance hall was the site of a mixture of
older and newer forms of Caribbean music, including calypso, soca, salsa, AfroCuban, ska, and reggae.”).
17. Shervin Rezaie, Play Your Part: Girl Talk’s Indefinite Role in the Digital Sampling Saga, 26 TOURO L. REV. 175, 179 (2010). The author provides an
interesting discussion of the origins of “break dancing,” where dancers performed moves in synchronization with breaks in “part[s] of a song where the
percussion section takes over and jams for thirty to fifty seconds.” Id. For a
lively discussion of the progression of sampled music from disco, to house, to
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The creation of the MIDI synthesizer in the 1980s allowed
artists and producers to digitally sample snippets of songs previously recorded by other musicians by merely pushing a key
on an electronic keyboard that would trigger any type of recorded sound from a trumpet to a bass drum and anything in between.18 Indeed, “[a] sample can be a recording of something
quite brief, like a snapped finger, or something many measures
long, like a sustained grand piano note.”19 Thus, the antiquated
practice of manual or analog sampling that was prevalent in
the ‘60s and ‘70s was quickly replaced by cheap and easily accessible digital sampling equipment that enabled the production of a “perfect reproduction that can be manipulated and inserted into a new song.”20 This modern sampling technology
arms musicians with the ability to copy and alter the original
sounds by changing their pitch and other elements.21 However,
rave, to “neo-gothic,” see SUSAN BROADHURST, LIMINAL ACTS: A CRITICAL
OVERVIEW OF CONTEMPORARY PERFORMANCE AND THEORY 149–52 (1999).
18. See Neela Kartha, Note, Digital Sampling and Copyright Law in a
Social Context: No More Colorblindness!!, 14 U. MIAMI ENT. & SPORTS L. REV.
218, 224 (1997).
19. RICHARD MANSFIELD, THE SAVVY GUIDE TO DIGITAL MUSIC 141
(2005).
20. Somoano, supra note 13, at 296. The difference between analog and
digital sound recording technology has been described as follows:
Until recently, sound recordings were made only in waveform or “analog” form, where sound was captured through a microphone and recorded directly into the recording medium. In contrast, digital recording translates the analog sound into evenly spaced intervals or
samples, which are given a binary code and recorded directly into a
sampling keyboard or digital sampler. Once recorded on digital tape,
the binary code can be exactly reproduced in whole or in part through
the use of a digital-to-analog converter. As there is virtually no distinction to the human ear between the original and the digitally sampled copy, sampling has been deemed “exact copying.” The digitally
recorded sound can also be altered by rearranging the binary code in
order to change the pitch, duration or sequence of the sound, or combining the sample with other recorded sounds. It is this process of alteration of previously recorded music that has been the focus of the
majority of digital sampling disputes.
Margaret E. Watson, Unauthorized Digital Sampling in Musical Parody: A
Haven in the Fair Use Doctrine?, 21 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 469, 473 (1999).
21. Mike Suppapola, Confusion in the Digital Age: Why the De Minimis
Use Test Should be Applied to Digital Samples of Copyrighted Sound Recordings, 14 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 93, 101 (2006); see also Somoano, supra note
13, at 296 (explaining that “digital sampling, unlike analog sampling, allows
artists to easily sample from commercially available digital media, such as
compact discs, while gaining a greater ability to alter the speed, pitch, and
other characteristics of a sample”).
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because sampling cannot manipulate the distinctive tonal quality of the underlying sounds, such sounds “invariably retain
their unique qualities” when sampled.22
Musicians using the limited-memory-chip musical technology that was available in the 1970s were considered programmers and players, and in the music manufacturing industry “it
was generally believed that they created their own, original
sounds to meet their specific musical needs.”23 However, by the
late 1970s, at least eighty percent of musicians utilizing computerized musical technology were not actually programming
any of their own music but were instead “relying almost exclusively” on the preset sounds contained in the memory of the
musical equipment they were buying.24 At “the end of the decade, marketing departments were estimating that as few as
[ten] percent of users programmed their own sounds.”25 Not
surprisingly, “[t]his practice of digitally sampling sound recordings led to an increase in litigation in the 1990s, and remains a
hotly contested issue today.”26
II. THE CONTINUED DEBATE OVER UNAUTHORIZED
USE OF DIGITAL SAMPLES
The overarching issue regarding digital sampling continues
to pose a challenge to determining the proper legal fences to
construct around the ownership rights in musical sound recordings.27 While most legal scholars seem to concur that copyright
owners should reasonably expect some form of protection for
unauthorized sampling of their sound recordings (i.e., they
agree that the taking and use of others’ recordings is not a per
se entitlement)28 the battle lines appear to be drawn regarding

22. Michael L. Baroni, A Pirate’s Palette: The Dilemmas of Digital Sound
Sampling and a Proposed Compulsory License Solution, 11 U. MIAMI ENT. &
SPORTS L. REV. 65, 70 (1993).
23. PAUL THÉBERGE, ANY SOUND YOU CAN IMAGINE: MAKING
MUSIC/CONSUMING TECHNOLOGY 75 (1997).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Somoano, supra note 13, at 296.
27. See generally Baroni, supra note 22, at 65–67 (providing an overview
of concerns surrounding digital sampling and the uncertainty as to whether
digital sampling is ever legal).
28. See, e.g., Ashtar supra note 15; Baroni, supra note 22; Suppapola, supra note 21. In fact, this attitude comports with how most Americans generally regard copyright ownership of songs. In a recent poll conducted by performing rights organization Broadcast Music Incorporated, an overwhelming
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the age-old, global debate over whether the “essence” of intellectual property ownership is different from the rights imbued
to the owners of tangible or real property.29 This disputation
becomes even more pronounced in the specific area of digital
music sampling.30
Music, like real and personal property, provides value to its
owner.31 While determining the fair market value of Blackacre
or a diamond ring may be economically discernible, “[m]usic is
a hedonic product whose evaluation is based primarily on the
experience it provides to a consumer rather than on specific
product attributes.”32 Indeed, music “presents us with something special that stimulates and soothes the very essence of
the human spirit” and “draws out the most dynamic of human
emotion,” even more so than other forms of copyright.33 Some
percentage of Americans—eighty-five percent to be exact—claimed a belief
that songwriters deserve to be paid for their contributions. The question asked
in the poll was, “‘If there was a party that wasn’t compensating songwriters,
do you think that would be wrong?’ And the answer to the question was, ‘Yes!’”
John Bowe, The Copyright Enforcers, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 8, 2010 (Magazine), at
40.
29. Ian McClure, Note, Be Careful What You Wish For: Copyright’s Campaign For Property Rights And An Eminent Consequence Of Intellectual Monopoly, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 789, 790 (2007).
30. See, e.g., Joseph P. Liu, Regulatory Copyright, 83 N.C. L. REV. 87, 152
(2004) (arguing that the continued application of traditional fair use principles
to complex sampling issues is inadequate, and proposing that a “flexible regulatory regime” should be created by Congress to enact and oversee specific industry exemptions to copyright in the area of sampling that would only be imposed when there exists “a threshold level of economic significance” with
respect to defendant’s taking); Lauren Fontein Brandes, Comment, From Mozart to Hip-Hop: The Impact of Bridgeport v. Dimension Films on Musical
Creativity, 14 UCLA ENT. L. REV. 93, 127 (2007) (arguing that those who sample music created and owned by others should be afforded a de minimis defense if found liable for copyright infringement); A. Dean Johnson, Note, Music
Copyrights: The Need for an Appropriate Fair Use Analysis in Digital Sampling Infringement Suits, 21 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 135, 164 (1993) (arguing that
fair use should remain a legitimate defense when sampling an original sound
recording).
31. See Herbert v. Shanley Co., 242 U.S. 591, 594–95 (1917) (holding that
the unauthorized performance of a copyrighted musical composition in a restaurant or hotel infringes the owner’s exclusive right to perform the work publicly for profit). Justice Holmes famously wrote, “If music did not pay, it would
be given up.” Id. at 595.
32. H. RAGHAV RAO & SHAMBHU UPADHYAYA, INFORMATION ASSURANCE,
SECURITY, AND PRIVACY SERVICES 548 (2009).
33. James H. Napper, III, Life as Art: How Technology and the Infusion of
Music Into Daily Life Spurred the Sound Recordings Act of 1971, 12 TUL. J.
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 161, 165–66 (2009) (acknowledging that “music has
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would argue that the value of music “relies solely on the ability
of the listener to recognize the music.”34 This philosophy is evident in fair use cases involving music, such as Campbell v.
Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., because in order to create an effective
parody of a song, “the artist must take the most identifiable
pieces of the song.”35
Unfortunately, it has become customary—and even modish—for copyright scholars to describe sampling as mere borrowing or referencing of previous music, akin to the age-old
practice of imitating uncopyrightable musical ideas, patterns,
and performance styles.36 Some even go so far as to claim that
because “the reservoir of [musical] artistic ingenuity has been
expended, a digital sampler has no choice but to ‘borrow’ from
the past.”37 While most legal scholars re-echo this popular
‘sampling equals borrowing’ mantra and “warn that the enclosure of the public domain represents a major crisis facing both
the law of ideas and American culture,”38 there are some—
become totally enmeshed in the daily lives of Americans” and undoubtedly affects how people behave, relate to one another societally, and respond to one
another on an extremely personal level); see also David Munkittrick, Note,
Music As Speech: A First Amendment Category Unto Itself?, 62 FED. COMM. L.
J. 665, 668–69 (2010) (discussing the unique function of music in society and
claiming that “[a]s a protected mode of expression, music must be understood
on its own terms”).
34. William Henslee, You Can’t Always Get What You Want, But If You
Try Sometimes You Can Steal It And Call It Fair Use: A Proposal To Abolish
The Fair Use Defense For Music, 58 CATH. U. L. REV. 663, 686 (2009).
35. Id. at 686.
36. See, e.g., Ashtar, supra note 15, at 285 (“Samplers’ corpora have expanded wildly as artists borrow from sources as diverse as aboriginal music,
foreign film, industrial sounds, and even press conferences.”); Brandes, supra
note 30, at 100 (comparing the acts of modern musicians who borrow digital
samples to classical composers who borrow themes, musical phrases, and ideas); Jennifer R.R. Mueller, Comment, All Mixed Up: Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films and De Minimis Digital Sampling, 81 IND. L.J. 435, 457 (2006)
(“Sample-based recording artists, like writers, visual artists, and filmmakers,
necessarily borrow from others in order to create their works . . . .”); Matthew
G. Passmore, Note, A Brief Return to the Digital Sampling Debate, 20
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT L.J. 833, 843 (1998) (maintaining that an artist who
samples “borrows sources from the artist’s experience of the surrounding
world and incorporates these sources in the generation of a novel and critical
artistic expression”).
37. Brandon G. Williams, James Brown v. In-Frin-Jr.: How Moral Rights
Can Steal the Groove, 17 ARIZ. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 651, 653 (2000) (emphasis
added).
38. David Fagundes, Crystals in the Public Domain, 50 B.C. L. REV. 139,
140 (2009) (“Every great story has a villain, and in the story told by enthusiasts of the public domain [in copyright law], that villain is property.”).
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albeit, a vast minority—who embrace the axiom that “[u]sing
someone else’s music without paying for it should almost never
be a fair use.”39 In a refreshing departure from the common
sampling repertoire, Michael Allyn Pote is one of the few scholars who have recently challenged the notion that sampling is
mere borrowing of ideas, as opposed to a taking of the copyrightable expression of such ideas.40 Responding to a copyright
author who claims, in the words of Pote, that music “has a long
history of borrowing from previous musical works,” Pote opines
that the author “fails to recognize that the extent of the borrowing is limited to the ideas of the works since more extensive
borrowing, such as borrowing the actual expression, would disrupt the incentive provided to artists.”41 Indeed—as Pote conveys—it is well documented that modern digital technology
makes “cloning,” and not just mere copying, borrowing, or referencing of past music possible because the quality of the original recording is entirely preserved and, in the case of sampling,
duplicated exactly into the new recording.42
While it is true that third-party non-owners of both real
property and music undoubtedly find value in these commodities owned by others, the law protects that value much more

39. Henslee, supra note 34, at 692–93; see also Lea Shaver & Caterina
Sganga, The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life: On Copyright and Human
Rights, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 637, 637 (2010). The authors state that “for over a
decade, legal scholars and public interest advocates have endeavored to defend
creative and communicative liberty against efforts at excessive control
through copyright.” Id. The authors also maintain that states wishing to ensure that all of their citizens have the fundamental “‘right to take part in cultural life’” have “a legal obligation to ensure that their intellectual property
frameworks do not provide excessive protections at the expense of cultural
participation.” Id. at 640.
40. See Michael Allyn Pote, Comment, Mashed-Up in Between: The Delicate Balance of Artists’ Interests Lost Amidst the War on Copyright, 88 N.C. L.
REV. 639, 668 (2010).
41. Id. at 667–68 (emphasis added).
42. See STEVEN BROWN & ULRIK VOLGSTEN, MUSIC AND MANIPULATION:
ON THE SOCIAL USES AND SOCIAL CONTROLS OF MUSIC 340 (2006); Pote, supra
note 40, at 668 (explaining that a digital sample copies the “exact expression”
as fixed in the original sound recording); see also JOANNA DEMERS, STEAL THIS
MUSIC: HOW INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AFFECTS MUSICAL CREATIVITY 41
(2006) (explaining the difference between musical “allusion,” which “occurs
when any musician refers to another work, knowingly or otherwise,” including
“arrangements, sound-alike recordings, and cover songs” and reproduction of
sound, which “can be mechanically duplicated in only one way, by playing it
back after it has already been fixed onto a recording medium”).
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narrowly than that derived by the owners/creators.43 When the
owner of a piece of real property purchases title in a tract of
land, he justifiably expects that he will be provided with legal
rights that allow him to exclude all others from that land with
few exceptions, such as necessity or eminent domain.44 Similarly, when the author of a song creates a copyrightable work, he
operates under the premise that the law will protect him from
unauthorized third-party use of that song with few exceptions,
such as fair use.45 The challenge faced by courts in interpreting
digital sampling cases is to create parameters around the specific uses of sound recordings, which owners of such works
should reasonably expect to be exclusive to them versus when
owners should bow to the unlicensed, unremunerated uses by
third parties who are not authors of such works.46
An understanding of the complexities of this task begins
here with an analysis of the legal protections of sound recordings offered in the United States and Germany, as well as the
exceptions to such rights. In recognition that sampling can neither be dismissed as merely an innocent practice of imitation
nor authorized without legal scrutiny as a tool of entitlement
for new musicians or genres of music, cases like Bridgeport
Music and Kraftwerk continue to scrutinize closely the practice
of unauthorized sampling.47
III. THE LAWS PROTECTING SAMPLES AS SOUND
RECORDINGS
Sound recordings are not recognized by the same legal doctrines in the United States and Germany.48 The fundamental

43. See Pote, supra note 40, at 658–59 (explaining that artists have an
overarching, exclusive right to work, limited by various exceptions).
44. See McClure, supra note 29, at 811–12.
45. See id. at 791 (“[Some individuals] equate such exclusivity [in copyrights] to that which is afforded by property laws to owners of real and personal private property.”).
46. See Pote, supra note 40, at 669–70.
47. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films LLC, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830,
(M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev’d 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004), rev’d 401 F.3d 647 (6th
Cir. 2004), aff’d and amended on reh’g 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005);
Bundesgerichtshof [BGH][Federal Court of Justice] I ZR 112/06 Nov. 20, 2008,
Systamatische Sammlung der Entscheidungen des Bundesgerichtshofes
[BGHR] (Ger.).
48. Laura A. Pitta, Economic and Moral Rights Under U.S. Copyright
Law: Protecting Authors and Producers in the Motion Picture Industry,12 ENT.
& SPORTS LAW, Winter 1995, at 3, 3 (1995).
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differences between the legal regimes that protect copyright in
the United States (the common law system) and Germany (the
civil law system) can be understood by studying the philosophical backdrop that existed in the seventeenth-century, when the
protection of creative works shifted “from a sovereign privilege
to a statutory right.”49 The first school of thought that emerged
during this period in the civil law countries—especially France
and Germany—was centered on natural law theory.50 Natural
law theory advanced the notion that, because authors invested
creativity in their works, the works should belong to them, and
rights in the works should extend to their economic interest as
well as their personal interest.51
In natural law theory, also known as the artists’ rights or
droit d’auteur copyright system, “the artist’s personality is of
foremost importance and is the essence of the relationship between the artist and his work. The relationship is not based on
the end result—i.e., the work of art—but on the materialization
of the artist’s personality in his creation.”52 Some have described these rights as “moral rights” or “human rights” because they protect the individual traits found in an author’s
work, as well as a dimension of that creation that reflects
something over and above the artist’s desire to earn an income
from the pecuniary exploitation of his or her work.53 Artists’
moral rights include (1) attribution, the right to either claim or
disclaim credit for creating a work; (2) integrity, “the right to
ensure that the work is not changed” absent consent of the artist; (3) publication, the right to conceal the work from the public until the artist determines it to be satisfactory; and (4) retraction, the right to renounce authorship of a work and
prevent its public display or dissemination.54
As the artists’ rights rationale was forming mainly on the
European continent, the common law was developing in a different way in other countries.55 In common law countries— like

49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. W.W. Kowalski, A Comparative Law Analysis of the Retained Rights of
Artists, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1141, 1146–47 (2005).
53. Aurele Danoff, The Moral Rights Act of 2007: Finding the Melody in
the Music, 1 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP & L. 181, 183 (2007).
54. Id.
55. Pitta, supra note 48, at 3.
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the United States and the United Kingdom—when legislators
codified rights, they replaced natural law and provided authors
with only limited economic protection in the form of an exclusive reproduction right for a limited time.56 The purpose of this
right “was to protect the economic rights held by creators or
publishers who purchased the original creator’s rights. Thus,
creators relinquished all rights in a work (unless otherwise
contractually agreed) in exchange for pecuniary recompense.”57
Copyright law was codified pursuant to this theory, and thus
recognizes “the creation of the work mainly as an aspect of
property” or an “enrichment of the artist as a result of his
work.”58 As discussed in more detail below, these philosophies
shaped the ways in which differing legal protection of sound recordings have developed, and continue to develop, in the United
States and Germany.59
A. THE UNITED STATES: COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR SOUND
RECORDINGS
Copyright protection for owners of musical works, including sound recordings, is derived from the United States Constitution, which provides Congress with the enumerated power
“[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”60 Congress
appears to recognize that copyright rights are best structured
by providing exclusive and well-delineated privileges to authors
of original works.61 Each version of the Copyright Act throughout history has been drafted with the assumption that authors
will be incentivized to create works for the enjoyment of the
public only when the law “provide[s] copyright owners with a
clear baseline right to exclude non-paying members of society
from using the work in ways that the Copyright Act specifically
sets out” in order to “facilitate consensual transfers of clearly
defined entitlements in literary and artistic works for payment.”62 In other words, copyright law in the United States has
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Kowalski, supra note 52, at 1147.
59. See Pitta, supra note 48, at 3.
60. U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
61. Alina Ng, When Users Are Authors: Authorship in the Age of Digital
Media, 12 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 853, 857 (2010).
62. Id.
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historically been concerned with setting delineated boundaries
(or “good fences”) around the rights of creators of original
works.63 As such, the Copyright Act protects original works as
property of the copyright owner as:
[A] Coasean bargain, to allow market transactions to occur. The idea
behind statutorily-recognized property rights in literary and artistic
works is a manifestation of classical law and economic thought on
cost-benefit forms of legal analysis—in order to encourage authorship
and increase public welfare, authors must be paid with exclusive
rights for their work. This payment encourages authors to create and
commercialize their works on the market. The assumption behind a
law and economics approach to the copyright system is that an author
will only decide to create a work when the author is assured that the
expected market revenue from sale of the work exceeds his cost of expression.64

The first Copyright Act enacted by Congress to implement
the constitutional mandate did not protect music at all; the intellectual products that qualified for protection included only
books, maps, and charts.65 For the first time in history, musical
works were granted copyright protection under the first revision of copyright in 1831.66 In its current version, the Copyright
Act of 1976 protects various categories of works, including mu-

63. See, e.g., Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 517–18 (1994) (“Because copyright law ultimately serves the purpose of enriching the general
public through access to creative works, it is peculiarly important that the
law’s boundaries be demarcated as clearly as possible.”); Lotus Development
Corp. v. Borland Intern., Inc., 140 F.3d 70, 75 (1st Cir. 1998) (“When close infringement cases are litigated, copyright law benefits from the resulting clarification of the doctrine’s boundaries.”).
64. Ng, supra note 61, at 857−58; see also Tom Braegelmann, Copyright
Law in and Under the Constitution: The Constitutional Scope and Limits to
Copyright Law in the United States in Comparison With the Scope and Limits
Imposed by Constitutional and European Law on Copyright Law in Germany,
27 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 99, 104 (2009) (“Statements made by George
Washington and other Framers [of the constitution] . . . indicate that the Copyright Clause was intended to engender a marketplace in writings.”); Jeffrey
F. Kersting, Comment, Singing a Different Tune: Was the Sixth Circuit Justified in Changing the Protection of Sound Recordings in Bridgeport Music, Inc.
v. Dimension Films?, 74 U. CINCINNATI. L. REV. 663, 667 (2005) (“The natural
rights view treats an individual’s intellectual creations with the same protections and rights as tangible, physical property.”).
65. Napper, supra note 33, at 166. For an informative discussion of the
expansion of the coverage of copyright law in both the United Kingdom and
the United States from the Statute of Anne to the present century, see Lionel
Bently, The Author: From Death Penalty to Community Service, 20th Annual
Horace S. Menges Lecture, 32 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 1, 6–8 (2008).
66. Napper, supra note 33, at 166.
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sical compositions and sound recordings.67
It is essential to comprehend the fundamental differences
between musical compositions and sound recordings in order to
understand the evolution of sampling jurisprudence in the
United States.68 The difficult problem for samplers is that any
time they reproduce and distribute copies of a musical work
they create, and such work contains a sampled portion neither
initially created nor owned by them, multiple clearances will be
necessary because two separate copyrights are implicated: the
first in the sound recording itself and the second in the composition.69 One author has described the difference between the
two copyrights as follows:
The copyright in a sound recording is distinct from the copyright in
the musical composition that may be embodied in the sound recording. The musical composition is what most of us think of as the song.
The song exists independent of any particular recording of the song;
consequently, there can be a number of different sound recordings of
the same song by different recording artists. In most cases, a recorded
CD therefore involves two copyrights, one covering the musical composition and one covering the sound recording.70

Moreover, when a copyright is extended to a sound recording it is thought to encompass both the contributions of the
particular artist(s) performing the composition whose creativity
is captured in the resultant recording, as well as the contributions of those responsible for capturing, processing, mixing, and
engineering the final recording (e.g., the producers and music
engineers who work with the artists in the recording studio and

67. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)–(8) (2006). Works of authorship protected by
copyright include the following categories: “(1) literary works; (2) musical
works, including any accompanying words; (3) dramatic works, including any
accompanying music; (4) pantomimes and choreographic works; (5) pictorial,
graphic, and sculptural works; (6) motion pictures and other audiovisual
works; (7) sound recordings; and (8) architectural works.” Id. For a discussion
of the protection of sound recordings, specifically, see H.R. Rep. No. 1476, at
56 (1976).
68. See Eric Charles Osterberg, Should Sound Recordings Really Be
Treated Differently Than Other Copyrighted Works? The Illogic of Bridgeport
v. Dimension Films, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 619, 620 (2006).
69. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1), (7). The Copyright Act distinguishes between
“musical works, including any accompanying words” and “sound recordings”
for purposes of copyrightable subject matter. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1)–(8). Therefore, “[w]hen a copyrighted song is recorded on a phonorecord, there are two
separate copyrights: one on the musical composition and the other in the
sound recording.” T.B. Harms Co. v. Jem Records, Inc., 655 F. Supp. 1575,
1576 n.1 (D.N.J. 1987).
70. Osterberg, supra note 68, at 620.
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make creative choices during the recording process).71 Because
“the level of creativity required for copyright protection may result from the way a piece of music is performed or from the way
a [natural] sound is recorded by the producer of the record, or
both,” it has been routinely held in music cases that even short
parts of music consisting of only a few notes played in a characteristic style will be determined to possess the requisite originality required by copyright law.72
Ironically, most consumers who ultimately purchase commercial copies of the recording will “deem the designated artist
the sole creator, and some recording artists would happily
agree.”73 However, because producers and engineers often control the recording session, those who play such roles in the creation of the recording also have colorable claims to copyright
authorship.74
To complicate matters even further for the sampling artist,
the musician who is the original author of the sampled song
has the ability to assign, transfer, or convey any of the rights
associated with copyright ownership.75 In fact, the standard
modern recording agreement will include an assignment of all
the recording musician’s original sound recording copyright
rights in exchange for the capital investment made by the record company and the many creative and economic contributions
the record company invariably makes to the finished product.76
71. Kersting, supra note 64, at 668.
72. Apel, supra note 11, at 334.
73. Mark H. Jaffe, Defusing the Time Bomb Once Again—Determining Authorship in a Sound Recording, 53 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 139, 142 (2006).
74. See id. The author notes the fact that a host of other contributors who
participate in the recording process, such as session musicians and back-up
singers, are not considered “authors” for purposes of copyright, since as a condition to their participation, they usually are required to sign written contracts declaring that they have no rights as such. See id. at 140–42 (noting
that there has been litigation because of a lack of such contracts and that not
every related issue has been completely litigated).
75. 17 U.S.C. § 201(d) (2006) (“The ownership of a copyright may be transferred in whole or in part by any means of conveyance or by operation of law . .
. .”). These assignments create problems for downstream users of copyrighted
material. See PETER K. YU, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION
WEALTH: COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS 173 (2007) (“The music industry is
characterized by dual layers of copyright owners, and each of those copyright
owners is granted multiple rights.”).
76. David Dante Troutt, I Own, Therefore I Am: Copyright, Personality,
and Soul Music in the Digital Commons, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 373, 423 (2010) (citing AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC
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The irony that results from this phenomenon is that, while the
primary responsibility to clear and pay for samples is placed on
the artist pursuant to the recording agreement, “the artist does
not even collect when her song is sampled because the owner of
the copyright in the sound recording is usually the record company, and the owner of the musical composition is usually the
publishing company.”77
Regardless of the form taken by a creative work, musical or
otherwise, “[c]opyright protection subsists . . . in original works
of authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now
known or later developed, from which they can be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated, either directly or with
the aid of a machine or device.”78 As such, upon the creation of
every sound recording, the artist and the producer are
acknowledged as having made “authorial contributions” which
qualify for protection under the Act.79 Once a work is created,
the copyright in such work will vest initially in the author of
the work.80 If there are many authors of a work—which is often
the case when musical works are created—the copyright will
vest in all of the authors, making them joint owners of the work
with co-ownership rights.81 Such rights include the “exclusive”
ability of the copyright owner to use and to authorize the use of
his work in various ways.82 Section 106 of the Act provides

LICENSING 105–06 (2d ed. 1996)). For a discussion of the economic realities
that exist in the music business, particularly that a substantial percentage of
music products invested in by record companies never turn a profit, see Michael P. Ryan, Knowledge-Economy Elites, the International Law of Intellectual Property and Trade, and Economic Development, 10 CARDOZO J. INT’L &
COMP. L. 271, 288–90 (2002), “Recording a music CD most often fails to bring
a respectable return on investment even under an effective copyright system.”
77. Kartha, supra note 18, at 234–35. The author goes on to note the expensive, time consuming, and often ad hoc processes employed by record companies to clear samples, including the fact that most record companies go out
of their way to get permission from sampled artists who do not even own the
copyrights to their songs “because if the resulting usage is offensive to the
sampled artist, it may cause a rift in their relationship [that] record companies want to avoid . . . .” Id. at 235.
78. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
79. See Bently, supra note 65, at 93 (contrasting the inclusive nature of
authorship within the American copyright system with the historically less
generous definition in Europe).
80. 17 U.S.C. § 201(a).
81. Id.
82. H.R. Rep. No. 94–1476, at 121 (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5736 (“[C]o-owners of a copyright [are] treated generally as tenants in
common, with each co-owner having an independent right to use or license the
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owners of copyrights in most works the exclusive right “(1) to
reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; (2)
to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work;
(3) to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work
to the public by sale or other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending . . . ;”83 (4) to perform the work publicly;
and (5) to display the work publicly.84 On the other hand, with
respect to copyrights in sound recordings—which the Act defines as “works that result from the fixation of a series of musical, spoken, or other sounds”85—the Act only confers the limited
rights of reproduction, preparation of derivative works, and distribution of copies; a performance right is provided for sound
recordings only to the extent performance is accomplished by
means of digital audio transmission.86
In order to comprehend why sound recordings have more
limited rights than those granted to other types of works protected by copyright, it is essential to trace the congressional
history of such protection. Until 1972, sound recordings were
not protected under federal copyright law, even though the underlying musical compositions that were invariably “embedded”
in recordings were subject to copyright.87 This resulted in the
anomaly that songwriters would receive all the benefits of federal copyright protection for their songs. Neither the recording
artists, producers, nor the record company would obtain such
benefits for the recording and instead would be forced to rely on
state copyright protection.88

use of a work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other coowners for any
profits.”).
83. 17 U.S.C. § 106. The Copyright Act defines a derivative work as “a
work based upon one or more preexisting works . . . .” Id. §101. The definition
of derivative works is expansive and examples of derivative works include, inter alia, a translation of a poem, a movie based on a novel, and most relevant
for the purposes of this article, a sound recording that samples another song.
See 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
2.10[A] n.8 (Matthew Bender, Rev. Ed. 2011) (“A sound recording is a derivative work in relation to the musical work recorded therein . . . .”).
84. 17 U.S.C. § 106. The act also allows for sound recording to be performed publicly by means of digital audio transmission. Id.
85. Id. § 101.
86. 17 U.S.C. § 106(6).
87. Jaffe, supra note 73, at 144 & n.50.
88. See id.; see also Meredith L. Schantz, Note, Mixed Signals: How
Mixtapes Have Blurred the Changing Legal Landscape in the Music Industry,
17 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 293, 305–07 (2009) (discussing generally the unau-
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Due to the growing concern in the music industry over
rampant acts of record piracy and unauthorized duplication of
musical works in the wake of the invention of the audio tape
recorder, Congress enacted the Sound Recording Act of 1971,
(now codified in the existing Copyright Act in §114), which extended copyright rights to sound recordings.89 The pertinent
provisions of § 114 are as follows:
(a) The exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording
are limited to the rights specified by clauses (1), (2), (3) and (6) of section 106, and do not include any right of performance under section
106(4).
(b) The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording
under clause (1) of section 106 is limited to the right to duplicate the
sound recording in the form of phonorecords or copies that directly or
indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording. The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under
clause (2) of section 106 is limited to the right to prepare a derivative
work in which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality. The
exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a sound recording under
clauses (1) and (2) of section 106 do not extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording that consists entirely of an independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds imitate or
simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.90

In the event someone other than the copyright owner engages in one or more of the exclusive rights provided by § 106,
the owner can sue such party for copyright infringement if he
can show possession of a valid copyright in the work and that
the defendant copied legally protected elements of the copyrighted work.91 Since direct evidence of copying is rarely if ever
available, most copyright infringement cases turn on the issue
of whether illegal copying can be inferred.92 An inference of

thorized duplication laws passed by most states in order to protect against the
unlawful duplication, distribution, and sale of sound recordings).
89. Sound Recording Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92–140, § 1(a), 85 Stat. 391,
391 (1974) (amending the Copyright Act to provide for the creation of a limited
copyright in sound recordings for various purposes, including protection
against unauthorized duplication and piracy of sound recordings); Andrew B.
Peterson, Note, To Bootleg or Not to Bootleg? Confusion Surrounding the Constitutionality of the Anti-Bootlegging Act Continues, 58 OKLA. L. REV. 723, 726
(2005); see also 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(7) (including sound recordings as a category
of works protected by copyright).
90. 17 U.S.C. § 114.
91. Valeria M. Castanaro, Note, “It’s the Same Old Song”: The Failure of
the Originality Requirement in Musical Copyright, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP.
MEDIA & ENT. L. J. 1271, 1278 (2008).
92. Smith v. Jackson, 84 F.3d 1213, 1218 (9th Cir. 1996).
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copying may be established by showing that a defendant had
access to the copyrighted work and that there is a substantial
similarity between the copyrighted work and the defendant’s
work.93 Whereas a typical copyright infringement action will
focus on an inference of copying, “the use of samples of preexisting, copyrighted sound recordings is obviously direct copying.”94
Accordingly, once the plaintiff in a sampling suit has proven
that the defendant used a sample of his original recording, he
has met his prima facie case for infringement.95
Whereas direct proof of infringement may be easier to
prove in sampling cases, the defendant still can assert a viable
defense of his copying. In addition to protecting the rights provided to authors of original works, copyright law also recognizes that these rights should not be protected to such an extent
that they stifle the creation of new works by subsequent authors.96 One way that U.S. courts ensure that a proper balance
exists between copyright owners and potential new authors in a
copyright infringement suit is by analyzing the requisite originality of the work in question.97 When the work is a musical
creation, if the defendant can convince the court that the part
or parts of the plaintiff’s song used in the defendant’s song are
not sufficiently original—or that they belong in the public domain as musical building blocks that should be available for
use by all musicians—then the plaintiff’s case will be dismissed.98
93. E.g., Art Attacks Ink, LLC v. MGA Entm’t Inc., 581 F.3d 1138, 1143
(9th Cir. 2009) (“[A] plaintiff must show a reasonable possibility, not merely a
bare possibility, that an alleged infringer had the chance to view the protected
work.”); Ellis v. Diffie, 177 F.3d 503, 506 (6th Cir. 1999) (“[A] plaintiff may establish an inference of copying by showing . . . a substantial similarity between the two works at issue.”).
94. See Pote, supra note 40, at 663.
95. See generally id. (explaining that not every case of copying amounts to
copyright infringement).
96. Castanaro, supra note 91, at 1275.
97. Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (“The trier of the facts must determine whether the similarities are sufficient to prove copying. On this issue,
analysis (dissection) is relevant, and the testimony of experts may be received.”).
98. See, e.g., Tisi v. Patrick, 97 F. Supp. 2d 539, 548–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)
(finding that the plaintiff’s claim of copyright infringement was entirely based
on non-protectable elements of his song: key, tempo, and chord structure/harmonic progression, the last being common to the rock music genre);
Intersong–USA v. CBS, Inc., 757 F. Supp. 274, 282 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding
that elements of the plaintiffs’ song that were found in the defendants’ song
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Another way courts ensure that the exclusivity rights given
to copyright owners are kept in check is by applying the de
minimis doctrine to infringement cases.99 The de minimis doctrine has been employed by courts in holding that the defendant’s technical violation of copyright is so trivial that the law
will not impose legal consequences on the defendant or that the
defendant’s copying has been so insignificant that it fails to
meet the requirements of substantial similarity, thus despoiling the plaintiff’s prima facie case for copyright infringement.100 Many commenters baldly assert that a de minimis defense should be available to sampling defendants as a matter of
right by making unsupported and emotionally charged statements about the doctrine as it pertains to sampling,101 such as
claiming that “one of the underpinnings of the de minimis principle [is that] rational people who are neither greedy nor litigious are not troubled by de minimis copying.”102 These scholars are terribly bothered by the fact that some very successful
bands, such as Pink Floyd have decided not to license any of
their protected music to would-be samplers.103
After the court has determined that the minimum threshold for copyright infringement has been met and the plaintiff
has persuaded the court that the defendant’s taking was more
than de minimis, the defendant may still avoid liability by as-

were not copyrightable because the descending scale step motive is a common
compositional device found in many other well-known songs, such as “Twinkle,
Twinkle Little Star,” and therefore, constitutes “‘scenes a faire,’ or ordinary,
unprotectible [sic] expression”).
99. Rezaie, supra note 17, at 185–86. De minimis is a truncated version of
“de minimis non curat lex (sometimes rendered, ‘The law does not concern itself with trifles’).” Ringgold v. Black Entm’t Telev., Inc., 126 F.3d 70, 74 (2d
Cir. 1997).
100. See Ringgold, 126 F.3d at 74; e.g., Amsinck v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 862 F. Supp. 1044, 1049 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (granting summary judgment against an infringement claim over use of plaintiff’s artwork in the
background of a movie in part because the plaintiff could not demonstrate pecuniary harm, which amounted to a de minimis claim).
101. See, e.g., Osterberg, supra note 68, at 640–41 (“[A sampler claiming a
de minimis defense] might legitimately think, ‘I don’t mind if someone takes a
few sounds I made, therefore the author of the work I am sampling is unlikely
to mind if I use a few sounds of his, especially if I change them so that they are
unrecognizable . . . .’”).
102. Id. at 641 (italics added).
103. Steven D. Kim, Case Note, Taking De Minimis Out of the Mix: The
Sixth Circuit Threatens to Pull the Plug on Digital Sampling in Bridgeport
Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 13 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 103, 126–27, 127
n.158 (2006).
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serting a number of affirmative defenses, the most prominent
of which is fair use.104 The current Copyright Act acknowledges
that works “for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research” can be argued as uses that are fair,
and thus, not an infringement of the owner’s copyright.105 Section 107 of the Copyright Act sets forth the following factors for
a court to balance in determining whether the defendant’s fair
use claim is legitimate:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use
is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market . . . of the copyrighted work.106

Most courts that have considered the fair use doctrine in
the context of digital sampling, however, have been hesitant to
find that such an argument will rescue the defendant’s behavior from being deemed infringement.107 This is largely because
the defendant is usually hard-pressed to argue that his new recording is not a commercial use108 but also because “[sampling]
can diminish the value of the original material, especially when
the copied portion lies at the heart of what has been taken.”109

104. Kersting, supra note 64, at 671–72.
105. 17 U.S.C. §107 (2006).
106. Id. § 107(1)–(4).
107. Nicholas B. Lewis, Comment, Shades of Grey: Can the Copyright Fair
Use Defense Adapt to New Re-Contextualized Forms of Music and Art?, 55 AM.
U. L. REV. 267, 286 (2005).
108. See generally id. at 290–91 (explaining that the commercial nature of
the work is only one factor for a court to consider and that it must be considered in relation to the transformative nature of the infringing work). There is
no consensus about what makes a transformative work, though many courts
have adopted a parody-satire distinction which requires the infringing work to
carry a transformative message about the original work. Id. at 288–89 (“[T]he
more transformative the work is, the less likely that any commercial intent or
other factor will weigh against it.”).
109. Id. at 286; see also Pamela Samuelson, Unbundling Fair Uses, 77
Fordham L. Rev. 2537, 2578 (2009) (“Except in cases involving digital sampling of sound recordings, courts have become more receptive to ‘quoting’ from
songs, pictures, and videos . . . .”).
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1. The Early U.S. Cases: Grand Upright, Jarvis, and Newton
Judicial interpretation of digital sampling began with the
well-known biblical admonition, “Thou shalt not steal.”110 In
Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Brothers Records, Inc.,
Raymond “Gilbert” O’Sullivan sued rapper Biz Markie for using
three words and accompanying music from the melody of
O’Sullivan’s “Alone Again (Naturally)” in Biz Markie’s “Alone
Again.”111 Once Biz Markie admitted to sampling without obtaining the proper licenses or clearances, the Southern District
of New York granted O’Sullivan’s preliminary injunction and
referred the matter to the United States Attorney for potential
criminal prosecution.112 Although the music industry cried foul
and most commentators scrutinized the court’s holding as a
cursory reading of copyright law and an unfairly lopsided victory for owners of musical works,113 there were arguably valid
reasons why the court felt so justified in its holding.114 The defendants and, more specifically, their attorneys, made the mistake that all copyright lawyers know is cardinal rule number
one: do not use the copyrighted material of another when you
have asked that person for a license and they have refused to
give one.115 While it was unfortunate for Biz Markie that he
was essentially deprived from launching a potential fair use defense for his actions because of ineffective counsel, the Grand
110. Grand Upright Music Ltd. v. Warner Bros. Records, Inc., 780 F. Supp.
182, 183 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). These four words begin the court’s decision, which
suggests an attitude by the court that digital sampling amounts to theft—an
action that, as Judge Duffy points out, “violates not only the Seventh Commandment, but also the copyright laws of this country.” Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 184–85 (noting that the defendants wrote O’Sullivan asking for
permission to use the sample).
113. See KEMBREW MCLEOD & PETER DICOLA WITH HENNY TOOMEY &
KRISTIN THOMSON, CREATIVE LICENSE: THE LAW AND CULTURE OF DIGITAL
SAMPLING 133 (2011) (“Judge Duffy overstated the degree of certainty that existed in the record industry in 1991 about whether and when sample clearances were obligatory. He also erred by not conducting a substantial similarity
analysis.”) The opinion also failed to address whether Biz Markie’s acts were
protected by fair use. Id.
114. Grand Upright Music Ltd., 780 F. Supp. at 184 (rejecting the defense’s
key assertion that O’Sullivan did not have valid copyright for the sampled music because the certificates were originally held by a corporation that had since
been dissolved).
115. Id. at 185. Biz Markie’s lawyers sent a letter to his label that attempted to shift the blame for his unauthorized use of the sample in the song to the
label, because they released the album before all the licenses could be obtained. Id.
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Upright court, in the one of the first holdings on unauthorized
sampling—while an admittedly over-the-top and one-sided
opinion—was attempting to lay some groundwork in setting
boundaries for copyright ownership in songs, as well as guidelines it believed sampling defendants should follow.116
Two years later, the District Court of New Jersey was
faced with a copyright infringement claim when defendants
digitally sampled portions of plaintiff’s song “The Music’s Got
Me” in their song “Get Dumb! (Free Your Body).”117 In Jarvis v.
A & M Records, the defendants copied two parts of the plaintiff’s composition: (1) the bridge section containing the words
“ooh . . . move . . . free your body” and (2) a “distinctive keyboard riff.”118 Because the plaintiff had a registered copyright
in the musical composition and the defendants admitted to copying without authorization, the court focused on “whether the
copying amounted to an unlawful appropriation.”119 In determining whether unlawful appropriation occurred, the court applied the “substantial similarity” test.120 Although the defendants argued that substantial similarity could occur “only if the
two songs are similar in their entirety,” the court rejected this
argument121 and denied the defendants’ motion for summary
116. See Joshua Crum, Comment, The Day the (Digital) Music Died:
Bridgeport, Sampling Infringement, and a Proposed Middle Ground, 2008
BYU L. REV. 943, 951–52 (2008) (“In the shadow of [Biz Markie’s case], digital
sampling is still characterized by courts as the most ‘brazen stealing of music’
possible.”). Many subsequent sampling cases have settled instead of face the
possibility of stiff financial penalties. Id. at 952.
117. Jarvis v. A & M Records, 827 F. Supp. 282, 286 (D.N.J. 1993).
118. Id. at 289.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 290. The court recognized that “the test for substantial similarity is difficult to define and vague to apply.” Id. The two-step test analyzes extrinsic similarity, focusing on the objective commonalities in the two works
and intrinsic similarity, relying on the conclusions of a reasonable person.
Hartman v. Hallmark Cards, Inc., 833 F.2d 117, 120 (8th Cir. 1987). The defendants challenged how much of a song needed to be copied for a reasonable
person to find infringement. Jarvis, 827 F. Supp. at 290.
121. Jarvis, 827 F. Supp. at 290–91. The court provided three reasons for
rejecting the defendants’ argument that an ordinary, reasonable listener must
confuse one work for the other for substantial similarity to exist. First, if a listener must confuse one work for another, “a work could be immune from infringement so long as the infringing work reaches a substantially different audience than the infringed work.” Id. at 290. Second, an infringing party may
escape liability even when appropriating a large or important portion of another’s work, thus “eviscerat[ing] the qualitative/quantitative analysis.” Id.
Finally, such an argument ignores the general principle that substantial simi-
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judgment because original elements of the plaintiff’s work were
literally copied.122 From the court’s perspective, this literal appropriation of “the exact arrangement of plaintiff’s composition
[said] more than what can be captured in abstract legal analysis.”123
Several years later in Newton v. Diamond, the Central District Court of California had the opportunity to refine the analysis of when sampling infringes composition rights held by
plaintiffs.124 Recognizing that original artists were becoming
more aware of their rights when third parties use digital samples of their music without authorization, the Beastie Boys’ attorneys affirmatively negotiated a license in 1992 to sample a
copyrighted sound recording of “Choir,” a musical composition
created and performed by Newton, a flautist and composer.125
As with most songs, the copyright ownership was split: Newton’s record company, ECM Records, owned the sound recording via a 1981 licensing agreement between Newton and ECM;
yet, Newton had retained ownership of the underlying composition in the same work.126 Throughout the Beastie Boys’ song
“Pass the Mic,” a three-note sequence and one background note
from “Choir” were continuously looped.127
Although the Beastie Boys’ sampling of the sound recording was undisputedly lawful, Newton sued, arguing that the
Beastie Boys were also required to obtain a separate license
from him to use the musical composition of “Choir.”128 The
court, however, refused to grant summary judgment to Newton
because the three-note sequence and one background note,
when separated from the musical composition as a whole, was
not original as a matter of law.129 The court rejected Newton’s
larity focuses on what constitutes a substantial portion of the plaintiff’s work
rather than the defendant’s work. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id. at 292.
123. Id.
124. See Newton v. Diamond, 204 F. Supp. 2d 1244, 1248–56 (C.D. Cal.
2002).
125. See id. at 1246.
126. Id.
127. Id. The three-note sequence and background note lasted approximately six seconds while “Choir” itself ran for almost four and a half minutes. Id.
128. Id. at 1247. Neither party contested that the license allowed the
Beastie Boys to sample the recording of “Choir.” Id.
129. Id. at 1253. Only original works of authorship can gain copyright protection. 15 U.S.C. § 102(a) (2006). The United States Supreme Court has stated that “[t]he sine qua non of copyright is originality.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v.
Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991). In order for a work of art to
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attempt to overextend the rights he owned in the composition
by maintaining that his own techniques in performing the composition in the studio, by overblowing the “C” note and using
breath control to emphasize the note, contributed to only one
part of the originality element.130 Noting that Newton was confusing the originality of sound recordings with the originality of
compositions, the court rightly held that “Newton’s practice of
overblowing the ‘C’ note to create a multiphonic sound, and his
unique ability to modify the harmonic tone color––do not appear in the musical composition, they are protected only by the
copyright of the sound recording of Plaintiff’s performance of
‘Choir,’ which Defendants licensed.”131
The court went on to hold that, even if the note sequences
were copyrightable, the Beastie Boys’ alleged infringement was
de minimis because only two percent of “Choir” was appropriated, the three-note sequence only appeared once in “Choir,”
and the note sequences were not distinctive or at the heart of
“Choir.”132 Thus, the court held that the defendants took neither quantitative nor qualitative portions of Newton’s composition.133 The court hung its hat on the fact that, because both
the note sequence in the composition and vocalization technique used by the plaintiff in the performance of the song are
common, “any analysis of distinctiveness must necessarily come
from the performance elements [contained in the sound recording copyright], not the musical composition.”134
At this point in U.S. sampling jurisprudence, most scholars, including myself, concluded that the Newton court not only
understood the difference between composition and sound requalify as “original,” it must meet a relatively low threshold: the work must be
“independently created by the author . . . and . . . possess[] at least some minimal degree of creativity.” Id. While the court did not find Newton’s three-note
sequence to be original, it noted that sequences of less than six notes could be
copyrightable when the sequences have accompanying lyrics, comprise the
heart of the musical composition, or are repetitive. Newton, 204 F. Supp. 2d at
1254.
130. Newton, 204 F. Supp. 2d at 1251.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1258–59. The sample could not be at the heart of “Choir,” in
part, because nobody would recognize “from a performance of the notes and
notated vocalization alone” that the source of the defendants’ song was, in fact,
the plaintiff’s underlying musical composition. Id. at 1259.
133. Id. at 1258–59 (using the quantitative and qualitative analysis necessary to find de minimis).
134. Id. at 1258.
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cording copyrights but also struck the proper balance in determining when the defendant’s use of a composition did not trigger infringement in an original work or, at most, implicated only de minimis sampling that ultimately did not rise to
actionable infringement. Now that the law on sampling copyrighted compositions seemed to be settled, it remained to be
seen whether and how the rationale of the Newton court’s determination would be applied to the very different nature of
sampling sound recordings. That is the issue that the Bridgeport Music court was left to face.135
2. Bridgeport Music: A Victory for Sampled Owners
In 1998, defendants No Limit Films, LLC and related entities released the film “I Got the Hook Up,” which included a recording of the song “100 Miles and Runnin’” (“100 Miles”) on its
soundtrack.136 Plaintiffs, owners of the musical composition
and sound recording rights in “Get Off Your Ass and Jam”
(“Get Off”) brought suit for copyright infringement, as it was
undisputed that “100 Miles” included a digital sample from the
sound recording “Get Off.”137
A “three-note combination solo guitar ‘riff’ that lasts four
seconds” opens the recording “Get Off.”138 From this guitar solo,
defendants copied, lowered the pitch, looped, and extended a
two-second sample, which appears five times throughout “100
Miles” for approximately seven seconds each time.139 Rather
than focusing on the copyrightability and originality of the solo
guitar “riff,”140 the district court concluded that the defendants’
sampling was de minimis and did not “rise to the level of legally cognizable appropriation” under the “fragmented literal simi-

135. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films LLC, 230 F. Supp. 2d 830,
832 (M.D. Tenn. 2002), rev’d 383 F.3d 390 (6th Cir. 2004), rev’d, 401 F.3d 647
(6th Cir. 2004), aff’d and amended on reh’g, 410 F.3d 792 (6th Cir. 2005).
136. Id. at 833.
137. Id. at 833. “Get Off Your Ass and Jam” originally by George Clinton,
Jr. and the Funkadelics; see Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410
F.3d 792, 796 (6th Cir. 2005).
138. Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 796.
139. Id.
140. After listening to the recording “Get Off,” the district court concluded
that the guitar riff was entitled to copyright protection because “a jury could
reasonably conclude that the way the arpeggiated chord is used and memorialized . . . is original and creative and therefore entitled to copyright protection.”
Bridgeport Music, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 839.
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larity” test;141 therefore, the court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment.142
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the plaintiffs argued that a
de minimis inquiry is inappropriate when an undisputed and
unlawful digital sample of a sound recording is involved.143 The
Sixth Circuit agreed with the plaintiffs, reversing the district
court,144 and developed a bright-line rule: “Get a license or do
not sample.”145 The court explained that, while the de minimis
doctrine may be applicable in cases where infringement of the
music composition is at issue, the infringement analysis for
sound recordings necessitates a different approach.146 The most
controversial aspect of the case is the court’s self-proclaimed
literal reading of § 114(b) of the Copyright Act which led to its
holding that if the defendant cannot pirate the whole sound recording, he or she also cannot sample something less than the

141. Id. at 841. A typical cause of action for copyright infringement requires a plaintiff to prove that a defendant’s work of art is “substantially similar” to the plaintiff’s copyrighted work. Steinberg v. Columbia Pictures Indus.,
Inc., 663 F. Supp. 706, 711 (1987). Substantial similarity depends on “whether
an average lay observer would recognize the alleged copy as having been appropriated from the copyrighted work.” Ideal Toy Corp. v. Fab-Lu Ltd., 360
F.2d 1021, 1022 (2d Cir. 1966). On the other hand, the “fragmented literal
similarity” test for copyright infringement arises when there is literal but not
comprehensive similarity between the plaintiff’s and defendant’s works of art.
4 NIMMER & NIMMER, supra note 83, § 13.03[A][2] (“[T]he fundamental substance, or skeleton or overall scheme, of the plaintiff’s work has not been copied . . . .”). Although literal similarity exists between the two works of art, a
plaintiff will not prevail on a copyright infringement cause of action unless the
amount that is literally copied constitutes a substantial quantitative or qualitative portion of the plaintiff’s work. Id. at § 13.03[A][2][a]. Thus, use of a
snippet of a plaintiff’s song throughout a defendant’s song will not establish
liability if that snippet only constitutes an insubstantial amount and nonessential portion of the plaintiff’s song. Id.
142. Bridgeport Music, 230 F. Supp. 2d at 842. Qualitatively, “no reasonable jury, even one familiar with the works of George Clinton (the author of
‘Get Off’), would recognize the source of the sample without having been told
of its source.” Id. Quantitatively, the small amount sampled was a more significant portion of the later work which it was copied into, this could be significant, but quantitative analysis is only one factor of the substantial similarity
analysis. Id. at 841.
143. Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 798.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 801. The court did not believe that such a rule would stifle creativity because the free market would adequately control the price of sampled
music. Id.
146. Id. at 798.
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whole.147
The court was convinced that, by enacting § 114(b) of the
Act, Congress intended to provide broader rights to sound recording owners than it did to composition owners, as evidenced
by its inclusion of the word “entirely” in the following phrase of
§ 114(b) regarding so-called limitations of sound recording copyright owners”: The exclusive right of the owner of copyright in
a sound recording . . . [does] not extend to the making or duplication of another sound recording that consists entirely of an
independent fixation of other sounds, even though such sounds
imitate or simulate those in the copyrighted sound recording.”148
The Bridgeport Music court read this provision not as a
limitation on sound recording owners (as most scholars do), but
as an affirmation that the sound recording itself is an independently viable, creative product that should be treated separately from the composition copyright, and thus, analyzed separately and distinctively.149 As the court noted, “[f]or the sound
recording copyright holder, it is not the ‘song’ but the sounds
that are fixed in the medium of his choice. When those sounds
are sampled they are taken directly from that fixed medium. It
is a physical taking rather than an intellectual one.”150
In support of this bright-line principle, the court advanced
several important policy rationales in order to protect artists’
work from third-party digital sampling, even if only a de
minimis amount was taken, while also ensuring that the constitutional purpose of copyright law was served.151 First, future
third-party samplers are able to incorporate “riffs” from other
works into their own recordings without sampling by either (a)
independently creating the sound in the studio or (b) obtaining
a license.152 Moreover, “the world at large is free to imitate or
simulate the creative work fixed in the recording so long as an

147. Id. at 800.
148. 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2006) (emphasis added).
149. Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 800.
150. Id. at 802.
151. Id. at 801 (“We do not see this [bright-line rule] as stifling creativity in
any significant way.”); see also U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall
have the power . . . [t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries . . . .”).
152. Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 801.
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actual copy of the sound recording itself is not made.”153 Additionally, the market can control the prices of licensing fees.154
Second, although the amount sampled from a recording
may be de minimis, every time one musician samples another
musician’s recording, “the part taken is something of value” to
the copyright holder who fixes particular sounds “in the medium of his choice.”155 Further strengthening this rationale is the
conclusion that sampling is always intentional on the part of
the third party sampler in order to save costs156 and/or add
something to the third-party’s recording.157
Finally, the predictability of a bright-line rule led the Sixth
Circuit to reverse the district court’s decision and place emphasis on a de minimis inquiry.158 A de minimis or substantial similarity analysis is not ideal in cases of digital sampling, as it
would require “mental, musicological, and technological gymnastics” to determine the requisite threshold of what does or
does not constitute infringement.159 While it may be possible for
153. Id. at 800 (emphasis added). In fact, when owners of sound recordings
refuse to license their music to sampling musicians for re-use, or agree to do so
for such exorbitantly high fees that the sampling musician cannot afford it,
another option is to hire a “sample recreation” company that will re-record
new versions of the original song, “and can do so to such a high standard that
the original version and the new one are practically indistinguishable.” Richard Salmon, Sample Clearance: The SOS Guide to Copyright Law on Sampling, Sound on Sound (March 2008), http://www.soundonsound.com/sos/
mar08/articles/sampleclearance_0308.htm.
154. Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 801.
155. Id. at 802.
156. For an interesting viewpoint regarding the dangers of sampled music
replacing real session musicians, see Christopher D. Abramson, Digital Sampling and the Recording Musician: A Proposal for Legislative Protection, 74
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1660, 1662 (1999),
Digital sampling may be the greatest threat facing instrumental musicians today. The production of music using samples taken from
preexisting recordings in lieu of hiring live musicians is a unique
problem. Unlike a synthesizer, a sample does not sound like a musician playing an instrument, it is a recording of a musician playing an
instrument. Unlike a phonograph record, a sample allows a musician’s performance to be reused in a completely different piece of music. The reuse of the musician’s work distinguishes his or her plight
from that of the factory worker who is replaced by machines. Unlike
factory workers, musicians created the product that replaces them.
Id.
157. Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 801–02 (“When you sample a sound recording you know you are taking another’s work product.”).
158. Id. at 802.
159. Id.
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courts to conclude that any digital sample resulting in a
“modifi[cation] to the point of being completely unrecognizable
or impossible to associate with the copied recording” constitutes
infringement,160 a bright-line rule is more desirable as it substantially reduces uncertainty in the music industry.161 After
all, the Sixth Circuit’s opinion was focused on the impact of a
new bright-line rule on the music industry rather than being
driven by any considerations of judicial economy.162
Although the court was adamant in articulating its reasons
for a bright-line rule on sampling, it proceeded to hold that,
while the defendants’ actions amounted to infringement, they
were nonetheless entitled to a fair use analysis of their conduct
and that “[o]n remand, the trial judge is free to consider this
defense and we express no opinion on its applicability to these
facts.”163
3. Criticism of the Bridgeport Holding
The Sixth Circuit holding in Bridgeport Music has continued to be met with severe criticism by musicians and copyright
scholars.164 Subsequent courts hearing sampling-infringement
cases have similarly been reluctant to follow its rationale. For
example, in 2009, the Southern District of Florida had the opportunity to rule on the issue of digital sampling in Saregama
India, Ltd. v. Mosley.165 In Saregama, the plaintiff recording
160. Id. at 803 n.18. While the court’s ruling technically makes any unauthorized sample an infringement, “in practice it is likely that only commercially successful remixes will be prosecuted by the record industry.” Fredrich N.
Lim, Note, Grey Tuesday Leads to Blue Monday? Digital Sampling of Sound
Recordings After The Grey Album, 2004 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 369, 379
(2004).
161. AL KOHN & BOB KOHN, KOHN ON MUSIC LICENSING 1486–87 (3d ed.
2002).
162. Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 803.
163. Id. at 805.
164. See Matthew S. Garnett, Note, The Downhill Battle to Copyright Sonic
Ideas in Bridgeport Music, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 509, 516 (2005) (after
publication of the Bridgeport ruling, “commentary and criticism . . . erupted
across the Internet, in the ‘blogosphere,’ and in other publications”); see also,
Lim, supra note 160, at 377 (admonishing the court’s opinion by claiming that
it results in a situation where “the spirit of copyright law does not seem to apply when faceless corporations use the law to dissuade other artists from using
works within the corporations’ control”); Ben Sheffner, “Gurl” Trouble: Examining the Merits of Rondor Music’s Complaint About the Katy Perry Hit,”
BILLBOARD, Aug. 21, 2010, at 11 (referring to the court’s holding as “a decision
that sampling proponents have harshly criticized”).
165. Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F.Supp.2d 1325 (S.D. Fla. 2009).

5 REILLY FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE)

184

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

2/27/2012 1:46 PM

[Vol. 13:1

company sued producer Tim Mosley and other defendants for
their use of a sample of an Indian sound recording entitled
Bagor “Mein Bahar Hai” (BMBH) in Mosley’s song “Put You on
the Game” (PYOG) which was subsequently featured on “The
Documentary,” a 2005 album by Jayceon Taylor.166 Although
the sample was a “one-second snippet”167 of BMBH that consisted of three notes (D, B-flat and G), the notes together
formed a descending chord known as a G-minor arpeggio that
was looped four times in PYOG to create a two-second long “vocal unit”168 that was found in 109 of the 254 second duration of
PYOG.169 The defendants admitted to sampling BMBH and the
parties cross moved for summary judgment on the issues of
ownership of the copyright and infringement.170
Regarding the issue of ownership, the district court held
that a 1967 agreement executed between Saregama India’s
predecessor in interest and a third-party film producer conferred to Saregama India, at most, a two-year exclusive license
to the sound recording which became nonexclusive after the expiration of the two-year term.171 On the issue of originality, the
court found that while the sampled portion of Saregama India’s
song was a “common vocal exercise,” it would nonetheless be
reasonable for a jury to conclude “that the female vocal performance of the G minor chord is a distinct expression capable of
copyright protection.”172 The court next analyzed whether
“PYOG” infringed the plaintiff’s work, focusing on whether the
songs taken as a whole demonstrated that they were substantially similar, and if so, whether the defendants’ use of “BMBH”
was merely de minimis, and thus, not actionable.173 The court
found no substantial similarity as a matter of law because the
average lay observer would not mistake “PYOG” for “BMBH” or
be able to discern the source of the sample “without prior warning,” since “[o]ther than the one-second snippet, the songs bear

166. Id. at 1326.
167. Id. at 1330.
168. Id.
169. Brief for Appellant at 8 Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 687 F.Supp.2d
1325 (S.D. Fla. 2009) (No. 10-10626-F), 2010 WL 4411103.
170. Saregama India, 687 F.Supp.2d, at 1326.
171. Id. at 1326–27.
172. Id. at 1337.
173. Id. at 1337–38.
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no similarities.”174
It is noteworthy that the court went on to address
Saregama India’s contention, in direct reliance on Bridgeport
Music, that sound recordings should be analyzed differently
than musical compositions, specifically, that any sampling of a
sound recording constitutes infringement without application of
a de minimis analysis.175 Citing several copyright infringement
cases that deal with subject matter other than sound recordings, the court refused to carve out a separate test for sound recordings, instead insisting that the Bridgeport Music holding is
a departure from Eleventh Circuit precedent, which requires
the performance of a substantial similarity test for all claims of
copyright infringement.176 Additionally, the Saregama India
court opined that the Sixth Circuit’s reading of § 114(b) in
Bridgeport Music does not support its rendition of a per se taking rule for copying of digital samples because it “is more expansive than its text and legislative history suggest.”177
After the plaintiffs appealed the lower court decision, everyone in the music industry anxiously waited to see whether
the Eleventh Circuit would overturn the decision and apply the
same per se taking analysis to digital sampling as the Sixth
Circuit did in Bridgeport Music. In an anticlimactic holding on
March 25, 2011, the Eleventh Circuit in Saregama Music affirmed the district court’s ruling, holding that since the plaintiff did not own a valid copyright in the song recording at issue,
the court “need not face the question of whether this copyright
has been infringed.”178 As such, the Bridgeport Music court’s
ruling stands as the only appellate court precedent regarding
the issue of whether a de minimis analysis of a sampling defendant’s acts should be applied to the infringement of a sound
recording.

174. Id. at 1338.
175. Id. at 1338−41.
176. Id. at 1338–39. The court relied primarily on Leigh v. Warner Bros.,
Inc. for this assertion, quoting the court in that case as stating that “[e]ven in
the rare case of a plaintiff with direct evidence that a defendant attempted to
appropriate his original expression, there is no infringement unless the defendant succeeded to a meaningful degree.” Leigh v. Warner Bros., Inc., 212
F.3d 210, 212 (11th Cir. 2000). The Leigh case, however, involved a photograph taken by the defendants which, although similar to Leigh’s original photograph, did not directly use or copy any portion of it. Id. at 1214.
177. Saregama India, 687 F.Supp.2d at 1340.
178. Saregama India Ltd. v. Timothy Mosley, 635 F.3d 1284, 1290 (11th
Cir. 2011).
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4. Endorsement of the Bridgeport Holding
Despite widespread industry contempt for the Bridgeport
Music holding, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District
of Michigan issued an opinion three years later that unequivocally endorsed the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit regarding the
proper legal analysis that courts should follow in copyright
suits alleging infringement of a sampled recording.179 In
Fharmacy Records v. Nassar, the court was tasked with determining whether the defendants’ use of the plaintiffs’ recording
constitutes unlawful sampling under 17 U.S.C. § 114(b).180 The
court held that the defendants were entitled to judgment as a
matter of law because a reasonable jury would not be able to
conclude from the evidence presented that the defendants, in
fact, sampled the plaintiffs’ song.181 Regardless of the facts in
this particular case, the court opined that, had the plaintiffs established that the defendants did sample their music, their
claim “might survive” by “[a]pplying the proper test” for infringement of sound recordings as set forth in the Bridgeport
Music holding.182
In a copyright infringement action against a distributor for
acts of re-recording popular songs, another district court in the
Sixth Circuit recently reaffirmed the rationale of its upper
court’s holding in Bridgeport Music when it reiterated the “new
standard for analyzing copyright infringement of sound recordings.”183 The court also unequivocally stated that “the Sixth
179. Fharmacy Records v. Nassar, 248 F.R.D. 507, 509 (E.D. Mich. 2008);
see David M. Morrison, Bridgeport Redux: Digital Sampling and Audience Recoding, 19 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 75, 81 (2008).
180. Fharmacy Records, 248 F.R.D. at 509.
181. Id. at 528.
182. Id. The Fharmacy Records Court held that:
The protection afforded sound recordings in a digital sampling case
such as the one now before the Court, therefore, does not extend to
the “generic sound”; it only protects the recorded sound—the stored
electronic data digitally preserved by the composer. The substantial
similarity test thus has no place in determining whether infringement occurred. As the Sixth Circuit [in Bridgeport Music] explained,
“[i]n most copyright actions, the issue is whether the infringing work
is substantially similar to the original work . . . .The scope of inquiry
is much narrower when the work in question is a sound recording.
The only issue is whether the actual sound recording has been used
without authorization. Substantial similarity is not an issue.”
Id. at 527 (quoting Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 410 F.3d 792,
798 n.6).
183. King Records, Inc. v. Bennett, 438 F.Supp.2d 812, 850 (M.D. Tenn.
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Circuit held that any sampling of a sound recording constitutes
copyright infringement per se, regardless of whether the defendant’s work is substantially similar to the plaintiff’s work,
and regardless of whether the relevant audience can identify
the copied material.”184
The Tenth Circuit also favorably cited the Bridgeport Music holding when it ruled in a case where the owner of copyrights in karaoke music sound recordings sued a manufacturer
of retail karaoke products for infringement.185
The concept is simple. In order for a party in Palladium’s
position to lawfully use preexisting, copyrighted musical works
to create and sell its sound recordings, it must first secure the
appropriate licensing from the copyright owners of those musical works.186 By failing to comply with Section 115, Palladium
has illegally used the preexisting material.187 As a result, Palladium’s copyrights in the sound recordings at issue are invalid
and unenforceable.188
At least one scholar other than myself has embraced the
Bridgeport Music court’s willingness to distinguish that there is
a difference between the taking of basic melodies from a composition, which rightly belong in the public domain should it be
proved that such use is de minimis, and the taking of those
same melodies as captured in a sound recording. Michael Allyn
Pote has stated:
In a musical composition, the ideas may consist of rather basic elements of a song, such as arranging a song to end on a chorus, using a
guitar, or singing. Or, the ideas may be much more complex, such as
using a double-thumbing technique for guitar. The actual expression
of a musical composition would include, for example, the specific arrangement of notes that comprise the melody, the specific words used
to constitute the lyrics, and the combinations of all of the instruments
that create the rhythm and harmony of the song during a specific portion. The distinction for sound recordings is much clearer since the

2006).
184. Id. at 850 (specifically noting the rejection by the Sixth Circuit of the
substantial similarity test and the de minimis doctrine when analyzing sound
recording infringement claims).
185. Palladium Music, Inc. v. EatSleepMusic, Inc., 398 F.3d 1193, 1199
(10th Cir. 2005).
186. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films, 383 F.3d 390, 398 n. 7
(6th Cir. 2004) (“Needless to say, in the case of a [sound] recording of a musical composition the imitator would have to clear with the holder of the composition copyright.”).
187. See 17 U.S.C. § 103(a).
188. Id.
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expression is essentially the fixation of sounds. Thus, a digital sample, or really any sample, would copy the exact expression. The ideas
of the sound recording include such elements as the selection of reverb on the vocal or instruments, the spatial placement of the instruments in the mix, the style of compression applied to the overall mix,
and so on.189

From the above review of Bridgeport Music and the few
sampling cases that have followed, it is evident that the issue of
sampling sound recordings is far from resolved in the United
States. Concurrently, courts in Germany have been struggling
with the same point in question.
B. GERMANY: NEIGHBORING RIGHTS PROTECTION FOR SOUND
RECORDINGS
The German Constitution is similar to the U.S. Constitution in that it contains a specific provision—Article 14—which
authorizes the legislature in Germany to enact laws that will
provide for copyright protection.190 Article 14 contains both a
copyright protection clause for creators, as well as a duty to
balance that property interest with the public interest.191 The
German Copyright Act or Urheberrechtsgesetz (UrhG) was enacted pursuant to this constitutional authority in 1965, providing copyright protection for the life of the author plus seventy
years.192 In creating subject matter protection for copyright
189. Pote, supra note 40, at 668.
190. Christopher Geiger, Promoting Creativity Through Copyright Limitations: Reflections on the Concept of Exclusivity in Copyright Law,12 VAND. J.
ENT. & TECH. L. 515, 539 (2010).
191. Braegelmann, supra note 64, at 126. Because the property clause of
the German Constitution is qualified by a ‘public good’ /‘general welfare’
/’common weal’ provision (‘Allgemeinwohlbindung’), the legislature has to
make sure that it strikes a just and appropriate balance between the individual interests of authors to profit from their creations on the one hand, and those
of the public (and publishers and so forth) to exploit the works on the other
hand, taking into account the nature and social importance of the right in
question. Id.
192. Id. at 126–27. The German word “Urheber” means “creator of the
work” and generally covers all types of copyrights, including musical compositions and sound recordings. Jan Timothy Willams, Note, The Pre-Amended
Google Books Settlement, International Orphan Works, and German Copyright
Law: An Analysis, 19 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 51, 57 (2011). The pervasive use
of the term Urheber in German copyright law provides further insight to the
underlying natural rights philosophy which focuses on the creator as having a
special connection to the work, as opposed to the American view of copyrights
as primarily economic commodities that focus on the holder of the copyright.
Id. at 56−57.
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law, the state is required “to bring the different interests [of the
copyright owners] and the competing fundamental rights [of
the public welfare] in a proportional balance” by assuring that
the public has access to “cultural assets.”193
Although German copyright law does not recognize the defense of fair use in the same manner in which it is applied in
U.S. law per se,194 the concept of public access or “free use” of
cultural assets is generally analogous to fair use, and is promulgated with the following policy goals in mind:
One of the policy reasons for . . . UrhG’s time limit is that the general
public can demand the free use of intellectual goods for the improvement of cultural life (Kulturleben). Another is the fact that every creative person is not creating in a vacuum and without history but is rather building upon the work of his or her predecessors. Yet another is
that every cultural expression, if it is not forgotten, becomes some
kind of public good or intellectual/creative commons (geistiges
Gemeingut) and the cultural possession (Kulturbesitz) of everybody.195

In order to promulgate this policy, the German legislature
has enacted section 24 of the UrhG, commonly referred to as
the Freie Benutzung or “free use” provision, which allows thirdparty use of an author’s protected work without prior consent,
provided that the second work amounts to an “independent”
new work.196 Although the provision does not contain a clearcut definition of an independent work, it is “commonly recognised as such in German law if the elements of the older work
used ‘fade’ in comparison to the individuality of the new
work.”197 Like the U.S. doctrine of fair use, free use is an exception or defense to copyright infringement that is determined on
an ad hoc, case-by-case basis for the purpose of “find[ing] equitable and just solutions” when balancing the delicate rights of
owners and subsequent creators.198 However, the German free
use exception is an even narrower doctrine than fair use because it only allows for transformative uses.199 One German
court has explained the free use defense as only being justified
if the secondary work ceases to be “deferential” to the original
193. Geiger, supra note 190, at 540−41.
194. See Edward Lee, Technological Fair Use, 83 S. CAL. L. REV. 797, 872–
73 (2010).
195. Braegelmann, supra note 64, at 127.
196. Apel, supra note 11, at 344–45.
197. Id. at 344.
198. Paul Edward Geller, Hiroshige vs. Van Gogh: Resolving the Dilemma
of Copyright Scope in Remedying Infringement, 46 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A.
39, 43−44 (1998).
199. Id. at 43.

5 REILLY FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE)

190

MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.

2/27/2012 1:46 PM

[Vol. 13:1

work or adopts a “probing” approach to the original work, further clarifying its analysis as follows:
The question whether a new independent work has been created by
the free use of a protected earlier work depends on the distance which
the new work keeps from the borrowed personal features of the used
work . . . . In other words, as a rule the personal features borrowed
from the protected earlier work recede in such a way that the new
work no longer makes significant use of the earlier, so that the latter
appears only to have suggested the creation of a new independent
work.200

In addition to the distinctions between fair use and free
use, where the philosophical differences between copyright law
in Germany and the United States differ significantly (as previously discussed), is that the justification for copyright predominantly accepted in Germany is the fundamental qualification of the copyright as being based on a personality right, or
“moral right” known as Urheberpersönlichkeitsrecht, meaning
that “[i]n Germany, the copyright is intrinsically and inseparably tied to the personality of the author.”201 Just as with other
categories of creative authorship, German law offers legal protection to musical works pursuant to an “authors’ rights system,” which protects not only the creative endeavors of the person(s) who perform the work, but also the economic or
entrepreneurial efforts of the Tonträgerhersteller, or producer,
of the sound recording.202
Unlike the United States, in Germany there is no copyright
protection in the sound recording itself because sound recordings are simply not considered to be “intellectual creation[s],”
or creations that contain originality and creativity.203 Sound recordings are instead protected under the UrhG by “neighboring
rights,” or “related rights,”204 which “are granted to performers,
producers, and broadcasters, not for their original, creative input in making a sound recording/phonogram, but for the finan200. See Ian Eagles, Dr Zhivago’s Children: Some Lessons from German
Copyright Law’s Encounter with the Sequel, 10 NEW ZEALAND BUS. L. Q. 109,
111 (2004) (quoting BGH I ZR 65/96, 29 April 1999, reported in English at
[2000] ECC 355).
201. Braegelmann, supra note 64 at 127–28.
202. Apel, supra note 11, at 337.
203. Conley & Braegelmann, supra note 8, at 1018–19.
204. Id. at 1019. Neighboring rights are also referred to as “related rights”
in order to distinguish them from author’s rights in the copyright. JOHN
SHEPHERD, CONTINUUM ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POPULAR MUSIC OF THE WORLD,
VOL. 1 at 491 (2003).

5 REILLY FINAL_JAD (DO NOT DELETE)

2012]

2/27/2012 1:46 PM

GOOD FENCES

191

cial, organizational, and technical effort these persons expend
to make a sound recording/phonogram.”205 While the UrhG does
not specifically define “producer of a phonogram,” the term has
commonly come to mean “the natural or legal person in charge
of the organization for the whole process of recording.”206 While
this legal entity may be the creative producer in the recording
studio, it may also be the owner of the record company that
manufactures and sells copies of the recording after the recording has been made.207
One author has appropriately labeled neighboring rights as
“quasi-artistic rights allied to copyright law” and describes
them as:
[L]aws that protect performers’ renditions, broadcasts, and producers’
sound recordings. New communications technologies have redefined
this role between artists and intermediaries by making the old concert hall portable and bringing it into the homes of individual viewers
and listeners, along with the performers’ renditions. In so doing, performers, phonogram producers, and broadcast organizations often add
an important artistic dimension to the authors’ own contributions. In
effect, the neighboring rights laws enable impresarios, producers, and
performers to collect a reward for their services even under these
changed conditions, and this in turn further ensures that authors
covered by copyright law will also receive compensation.208

The policy reasons for the creation of a neighboring rights
in sound recordings in Germany stem from those that led to the
enactment of § 114 in the United States: “[t]he easy availability
in the market of increasingly efficient recording devices created
the growing problem of record piracy, which by now has become
a worldwide problem.”209 Other initiatives were taken in Germany to protect sound recordings, including ratification of the
1961 Rome Convention, formally known as the International
Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations, which is the only international treaty governing performers’ rights in sound recordings.210 The Rome Convention requires signatory members “to

205. Conley & Braegelmann, supra note 8, at 1021.
206. Apel, supra note 11, at 338.
207. Id.
208. See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2498–99 (1994).
209. See WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, INTRODUCTION
TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 6 (1997).
210. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF PERFORMERS,
PRODUCERS OF PHONOGRAMS AND BROADCASTING ORGANISATIONS, Oct. 26,
1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43.
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grant equitable remuneration to either performers or producers
of sound recordings, or both”211 by providing them with “the
right to authorize or prohibit the direct or indirect reproduction
of their phonograms.”212 Specifically, Article 12 of the Rome
Convention provides,
If a phonogram published for commercial purposes, or a reproduction
of such phonogram, is used directly for broadcasting or for any communication to the public, a single equitable remuneration shall be
paid by the user to the performers, or to the producers of the phonograms, or to both. Domestic law may, in the absence of agreement between these parties, lay down the conditions as to the sharing of this
remuneration.213

Neighboring rights, which almost always vest in a corporate entity, are also different from moral rights because they do
not stem from the personality of the artist or creator. Because
“it is considered inappropriate to accord corporations moral
rights,” the Rome Convention protects only the reproduction
right of the owner of the neighboring right, and not the right of
distortion, mutilation, or attribution.214 While a sampling defendant’s acts may result in an infringement of the artist’s
moral rights in the performance of the musical work at issue,
the Kraftwerk decision did not involve this separate right,
which is thus outside of the scope of this article.215
While neighboring rights, or verwandte Schutzrechte, are
generally comparable to the sound-recording right granted by
U.S. copyright law, in that the owner is provided with the exclusive right to copy the recording (yet receives no moral right
in the work), German neighboring rights exist in each and every sound recording that is produced without having to overcome
the originality requirement that exists under the U.S. Copy-

211. Matthew S. DelNero, Long Overdue? An Exploration of the Status and
Merit of a General Public Performance Right in Sound Recordings, 6 VAND. J.
ENT L. & PRAC. 181, 190 (2004).
212. INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF PERFORMERS,
PRODUCERS OF PHONOGRAMS AND BROADCASTING ORGANISATIONS, art 10,
Oct. 26, 1961, 496 U.N.T.S. 43. The “producer of phonograms” is defined in the
Rome Convention as “the person who, or the legal entity which, first fixes the
sounds of a performance or of other sounds.” Id. art. 3(c).
213. Id. art. 12.
214. Rebecca F. Martin, The WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty:
Will the U.S. Whistle a New Tune?, 44 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y U.S.A. 157, 167
(1997).
215. See Apel, supra note 11, at 338.
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right Act.216 Specifically, Section 85 of the UrgH provides the
producer with rights to reproduce the phonogram, to distribute
the phonogram, and to make the phonogram available to the
public, that expire fifty years after publication of the work at
issue.217
1. Kraftwerk: The German Court Rules on Sampling
In the 1970s, the band Kraftwerk emerged from Dusseldorf, Germany to defy the then-popular forms of disco and punk
music by becoming pioneers in a new genre of electronica (also
known as synchronized or “synch”) music that fused analog
synthesized bleeps, blips, and vocals “into a stark, precision
product . . . mostly with hand-built instruments.”218 Early
bands like Kraftwerk that created electronically generated music started by imitating traditional musical instruments, but
would later evolve to incorporate sampling techniques and other computer-generated or recorded media to the point where
the resulting work product contained “only a tenuous mimetic
relationship to live performance.”219
As Kraftwerk grew in popularity among its fans worldwide,
so did third-party use of sampled portions of its recordings.220
216. Id. at 8, at 337–38. The German equivalent to the low level of originality demanded by the United States is known as kleine Münze which translates
to “small change,” evidencing that “almost every creative expression is copyrightable in Germany.” See Braegelmann, supra note 64, at 111 n.59.
217. Apel, supra note 11, at 338.
218. GREG RULE, ELECTRO SHOCK!: GROUNDBREAKERS OF SYNTH MUSIC V
(1999). The founding members of the band were drawn to experimental music
and free jazz. They experimented with tape recorders, echo machines, and
drum machines. “Kraftwerk’s members were among the first pop musicians to
abandon traditional rock instrumentation for what was then still-new synthesizer/electronic technology.” Richard Harrington, These Days, Kraftwerk is
Packing Light, WASH. POST, May 27, 2005, at 8; see also, Richard T. Ford,
Save the Robots: Cyber Profiling and Your So-Called Life, 52 STAN. L. REV.
1573, 1581 (2000) (commenting that when Kraftwerk’s album “We are the Robots” was released in 1980, “it sounded like the soundtrack to a stylized form
of science fiction.”).
219. Ford, supra note 218, at 1581.
220. See, e.g., PASCAL BUSSY, KRAFTWERK: MAN, MACHINE AND MUSIC 128
(2004) (“To list the number of samples that have been taken from Kraftwerk
records would be an arduous and difficult task, but suffice to say that after
James Brown their records are amongst the most sampled . . . .”); Stephen
Dalton, Some of His Best Friends are Robots; Kraftwerk are the Elusive Kings
of Digital Pop, TIMES (London), Sep. 25, 2009, at T2 (noting that the band’s
“music has been sampled everywhere, from Fatboy Slim to the Chemical
Brothers, Missy Elliott to Jay-Z”). An Internet site created by fans of
Kraftwerk has listed nearly one hundred songs claimed to contain samples of
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In 1982, the band was furious after musician Afrika
Bambaataa made a record called “Planet Rock,” in which he
sampled a melody from Kraftwerk’s “Trans-Europe Express” as
well as a rhythm track from “Numbers” without asking permission or providing credit to Kraftwerk.221 After a legal battle
with Bambaataa, his song was renamed “Planet Rock/TransEurope Express” and Kraftwerk received royalties for sales of
Bambaataa’s records containing the samples.222
In 1977, Kraftwerk released an album that contained the
song “Metall auf Metall”, which is the subject of the band’s current sampling controversy.223 Twenty years later, two versions
of the song “Nur mir” by singer Sabrina Setlur were released on
two different albums224 and Kraftwerk sued,225 claiming that
the defendants, Setlur and her producers, unlawfully sampled
the “core” of “Metall auf Metall”—“a distinct rhythm-texture of
several percussion instruments,” which lasts approximately
two seconds and is repeated throughout the defendants’ song.226
More specifically, Kraftwerk argued that the composers of “Nur
mir” infringed Kraftwerk’s copyright, in addition to its rights as
performing artists and producers of phonograms.227
Kraftwerk prevailed at both the regional court and appeals
court based on the rationale that the composers of “Nur mir”
infringed Kraftwerk’s rights as producers of phonograms pursuant to neighboring rights law in Germany under Section 85
of the UrhG.228 Notably, the lower court did not rule on the issue of whether use of the sample by the defendants also constithe band’s recorded music. The Followers, KRAFTWERK SAMPLED,
http://www.cheebadesign.com/perfect/kraftwerk/sample.htm (last visited Aug.
6, 2010).
221. BUSSY, supra note 220, at 128.
222. Id.
223. Conley & Braegelmann, supra note 8, at 1025.
224. Id.
225. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice] I ZR 112/06 Nov.
20,
2008,
Systamatische
Sammlung
der
Entscheidungen
des
Bundesgerichtshofes [BGHR] (Ger.) (for an English translation, see Conley &
Braegelmann, supra note 8); see Apel, supra note 8, at 333 n.14.
226. Conley & Braegelmann, supra note 8, at 1026.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 1025–1026. According to copyright law in Germany, “[t]he producer of an audio recording shall have the exclusive right to reproduce and
distribute the recording.” Urheberrechtsgesetz [UrhG] [Copyright Act], Sept 9,
1965, Bundesgesetzblatt, Teil I [BGBl. I] at art. 83(1), last amended by Gesetz,
Dec.7, 2008, BGBl. I at 2349, § 2(1) (Ger.).
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tutes copyright infringement of the underlying musical composition; the case is, thus, based solely on whether Kraftwerk’s
neighboring right in the sound recording was infringed.229
The appeals court held that “even the unauthorized partial
reproduction and distribution of phonograms infringes, in principle, the rights of phonogram producers.”230 Rather than determining whether the amount sampled by the composers of
“Nur mir” was de minimis, the appeals court viewed the drumbeat rhythm-texture from bars nineteen and twenty of “Metall
auf Metall” as the “core” of Kraftwerk’s song as well as clearly
recognizable in the song “Nur mir.”231 Therefore, “by appropriating this particular element in its entirety, and continuously
underl[]ying it in the song Nur mir, the . . . [composers of Nur
mir] appropriated, in essence, the entire song [Metall auf
Metall], which consists of the continuous repetition of this
formative part, thereby saving themselves effort and expense.”232
The supreme court held that even if the core of Kraftwerk’s
song had not been taken, “the partial unauthorized reproduction or distribution of the audio recording that is fixed on a
phonogram interferes with the rights of the producer of the
phonogram.”233 The court reasoned that, to hold otherwise
would be inconsistent with policies set forth in the Geneva
Phonograms Convention, which “require that producers of phonograms receive protection against the reproduction and distribution of substantial parts of the sounds that are fixed on the
phonogram.”234 In its holding, the court reasoned, “[i]f only the
unauthorized reproduction and distribution of the entire phonogram were prohibited, the protection afforded the producer of
phonograms would be largely ineffective, as the Plaintiffs’ reply
to the appeal correctly points out, especially in light of modern
digital recording, reproduction, and rendition technologies.”235
Recognizing that neighboring rights are designed to protect
the producer’s economic and organizational efforts in the creation of the phonogram, which are separate from the infringement of the author’s rights or the personal intellectual creation
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Conley & Braegelmann, supra note 8, at 1018.
Id. at 1026 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1027.
Id. at 1027 (emphasis added).
Id.
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of the composer, the court held that the length of the phonogram copied by the sampler is irrelevant to the determination
of infringement “because every single bit of sound on such a
record owes its origin to the efforts of the producer.”236 Similarly, the supreme court admonished the appellate court’s reliance
on the significance of whether the quality or quantity of the
sounds taken were proper criteria in determining neighboring
rights infringement, pointing out that such a test in sampling
cases would lead “to difficulties of delimitations, and therefore,
to legal uncertainty.”237 In fact, even if short samples from original songs are not ultimately recognizable or discernible when
used in the defendants’ songs, such uses are nonetheless actionable even if they are proven not to have an effect on the
economic exploitation of the owner’s original song.238 This is
demonstrated by virtue of the fact that a market exists for even
the smallest sample of certain recordings, resulting in the phenomenon that, at the very least, the producer will suffer from
an economic disadvantage from lost royalties of sounds used by
others without prior consent of the producer.239
At this point in the Kraftwerk opinion, it appears that the
court is borrowing (pun intended) similar, if not the same,
analyses of sampling that the Bridgeport Music court employed, including notions of fairness, free riding, ease of infringement, legal certainty, judicial economy, and the importance in creating the proper boundaries of infringement for
those who choose to sample without obtaining a license.240 The
bottom line for both courts, as well as the message to potential
samplers, is that infringement of the sound recording in the
United States and the neighboring right in Germany will be determined if any portion of the recording is taken without authorization because taking any part is taking something of value to its owner.
236. Apel, supra note 11, at 343.
237. Conley & Braegelmann, supra note 8, at 1029. The court explained
that neighboring rights protect all sounds that are recorded on a phonogram,
from a work as complex as multiple movements in a symphony to one that
contains merely a “short bird chirp.” Id.
238. Id. at 1030.
239. Id. at 1030−31.
240. Id. at 1018; see also Apel, supra note 11, at 342 (noting that the
Kraftwerk court’s opinion not only referred to the holding in Bridgeport Music,
but that its reasoning on these issues are “in line with the prevailing opinion
in German legal literature”).
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The second part of the Kraftwerk opinion, however, is a
significant departure from this line of reasoning, and as such,
has been widely criticized by German commentators.241 Although the court unabashedly ruled that any taking from a
sound recording was an infringement of the producer’s neighboring rights, it went on to opine—as did the Bridgeport Music
court—that the defendants were, nonetheless, entitled to wage
a free use argument in an attempt to excuse their infringing
conduct.242 Unlike the Bridgeport Music court, however, when
the Kraftwerk court remanded the case back to the appeals
court to determine inter alia whether the defendants in the
case at hand can rely on free use, it provided guidance and a
specific test for the lower court to employ.243
First, the court observed that the free use exception set
forth in Section 24 of the UrhG cannot be directly applied to
neighboring rights of phonograms because the provision is set
forth in Section 85, paragraph 4 of the act, which contains the
limitations and exceptions to the use of the separate copyrighted “work,” or intellectual creation of the song, whereas neighboring rights are “only protected because of the entrepreneurial
effort that is embodied in it.”244 Nonetheless, the court went on
to hold that the defenses to copyright are “applicable by analogy to the exploitation rights of the producer of phonograms,”
providing the following public policy reasons for its position on
the matter:
[I]t would run counter to the spirit and purpose of section 24, paragraph 1, of the UrhG, which is to bring about cultural progress, if in
actuality only the creator [author] was obligated to accept the free use
of a work, while the producer of phonograms could prevent the free
use of the phonogram that contains the work. If the creator [author] is
obligated to accept a limitation to his copyright, then the producer of
phonograms must correspondingly accept a limitation to his neighboring right.245

While the court made it clear that the free use exception in
copyright applies mutatis mutandis to neighboring rights, it
provided two exceptions in which Section 24 would not provide
refuge to sampling defendants: first, in cases where the defendant is able to reproduce the sound copied in the phonogram by
241. See Apel, supra note 11, at 345–47.
242. Id. at 344.
243. Conley & Braegelmann, supra note 8, at 1037.
244. Id. at 1033. Chapter 6, part 1 of the UrhG contains most of the exemptions to authors’ rights. Apel, supra note 11, at 346.
245. Conley & Braegelmann, supra note 8, at 1033–34.
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his or herself; and second, when the part of the sound copied by
the defendant is a recognizable melody.246 Because the court
ascertained that there were insufficient findings by the appeals
court on these two issues, it remanded the case to the lower
court for further consideration in reliance on its opinion.247
On August 17, 2011, the court on remand first clarified
that the Freie Benutzung or “free use” provision of Section 24 of
the UrhG does, indeed, apply to “Nur mir” because the song is a
“complex construct” and the two-second-sample of “Metall auf
Metall” is only used as a part of the rhythm-sequence of the
newer track.248
The court proceeded to assess whether it would have been
reasonably possible for the defendants to produce the sound of
“Metall auf Metall” by themselves without resorting to use of
the actual Kraftwerk sample.249 After finding that the supreme
court did not provide criteria in which to determine this issue,
the lower court held that an identical reproduction was not
necessary; rather, the test is whether: (1) the average listener
would detect a difference between the defendants’ self-created
sound and the plaintiff’s sampled sound; and (2) the average
professional sound producer or engineer would reasonably have
been able to create such a sound back in the time when the infringing work was created.250 The court then asked two sound
engineers to rebuild the “Metall auf Metall” sample with
equipment that would have been available to professional
sound producers back in 1997 (the year when “Nur mir” was
created using the actual “Metall auf Metall” sample) who subsequently reported that it took between one and two working
days to create the sound that could have been used by defendants instead of the Kraftwerk sample.251 While the lower court
246. See Apel, supra note 11, at 345; Conley & Braegelmann, supra note 8,
at 1034.
247. Conley & Braegelmann, supra note 8, at 1037.
248. Metall auf Metall II, Hanseatisches Oberlandesgericht Hamburg
[OLG] [Higher Regional Court of Hamburg] Aug. 17, 2011, no. 5 U 48/05, 2011
ZUM 748, 749 (Ger.), available at http://justiz.hamburg.de/oberlandesgericht/
(search for “Metall auf Metall”; then click first link) [hereinafter Metall auf
Metall II]; See Simon Apel, Anmerkung zu OLG Hamburg, Urteil vom 17. August 2011, 5 U 48/05, 2011 ZUM 754, 755.
249. Metall auf Metall II, supra note 248, at 752.
250. Metall auf Metall II, supra note 248, at 750. See also, Apel, supra note
248, at 755.
251. Apel, supra note 248, at 751–53.
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held that such an effort would not have been unreasonable for
the defendants to accomplish in the studio, it nonetheless
granted the defendants yet another appeal to the BGH in order
to clarify the type of efforts that can be considered as reasonable.252
IV. THE DEVIL IS IN THE DEFENSES: WHERE
BRIDGEPORT MUSIC AND KRAFTWERK WENT AWRY
The crux of both the Bridgeport Music and Kraftwerk opinions is a two-fold message to samplers: de minimis is out, but
fair use and free use are in. In other words, when samplers
take any amount from somebody else’s sound recording absent
prior license, they will not be able to wage an argument that
such use is not copyright infringement (in the United States) or
neighboring rights infringement (in Germany), because both
courts essentially agree that any taking of a sound recording is
a per se taking.253 On the other hand, based on both countries’
constitutional policies requiring a balance of intellectual property rights provided to their owners with the eventual public
access to such works for the purpose of future production, defendants will nonetheless be entitled to a legal assessment of
the defenses of fair use or free use as applied to their conduct.254 It can be posited that such a rationale is, indeed, a
proper balance of the two-fold policy goals of intellectual property jurisprudence in building the proper fences around the
rights of original songs while allowing use of such songs by second-comers in order to foster the creation of new works. As
will be demonstrated, however, while these defenses may be
workable in the context of more traditional musical works, they
cannot feasibly be utilized in the complex arena of digital sampling of sound recordings without fashioning a test that is specific to the practice.
While the Sixth Circuit has stated that fair use is appropriate in sampling cases, it has failed to provide any guidance
whatsoever in assessing the issue in the context of sampling.255
Further, the Kraftwerk court applies the same rationale with
respect to free use, but provides a test that is meaningless, at

252. Id. at 754, 756.
253. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films LLC, 410 F.3d 792, 801
(6th Cir. 2005); Conley & Braegelmann, supra note 8, at 1028.
254. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Geiger, supra note 190, at 539.
255. See Bridgeport Music, 410 F.3d at 805.
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worst, or, at best, impossible to apply.256 The most frustrating
facet of the Kraftwerk court’s decision is its determination that
free use cannot apply when the defendant has the ability to
produce the sampled music in question, particularly since the
court provides no instruction to the lower court on remand regarding exactly how to assess this matter.257 This oversight indeed proved to be a burden for the lower court on remand since
“[t]he question of whether an artist could have produced a
sample himself is a particularly difficult one to answer when it
comes to the music scene.”258 In fact, some would allege that
duplicating a prior sound is extremely difficult and expensive,
if not impossible, and in most instances can only be “achieved
through some combination of luck and Herculean effort.”259
This is true for several reasons, such as the fact that the recording “gear needs to correspond to the particular sound for
faithful renditions, such as period microphones, outboards, amplifiers, and instruments,” and that “the acoustics of the physical recording space are often difficult to recreate.”260
On remand, the lower court in Kraftwerk was obviously
unsure how to answer such questions since it allowed the defendants yet another appeal to the BGH for further assistance
in clarifying the circumstances in which defendants could have
reasonably created the sample on their own. One can only
surmise how such a question will ultimately be answered and
what type of assistance will be provided by the BGH in its next
opinion. Will the court consider the musical capability or talent
of the particular defendant, the number of years the performers
have been playing, the formal or informal training of the musicians, the creativity and/or technological capacity of the producer in the studio, the financial ability of the defendant to
fund the recreation of the desired sound, the uniqueness of the
original sound, or a combination of some or all of these and other unforeseen and extremely subjective factors? Ironically, if
these standards are employed, then the more unique, original,

256. Conley & Braegelmann, supra note 8, at 1033–34.
257. Apel, supra note 11, at 345–46.
258. See Dario Radišić, Music Sampling and Copyright—Metal on Metal is
not Automatically “Metal on Metal,” GOETHE INSTITUTE (Oct. 2010),
http://www.goethe.de/kue/mus/pan/en6649772.htm.
259. Ashtar, supra note 15, at 307.
260. Id. (providing the example of a record company whose practice it was
to record sessions in a converted abandoned movie theater).
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and obscure the original sound is, the less the owner of the
sound recording is protected from non-compensated third-party
use. Such an anomaly, thus, provides samplers with an incentive to only use the highest quality sounds, or those they are
not able to recreate independently. It is difficult to fathom how
such an outcome will comport with the letter and spirit of the
UrhG or the German Constitution, especially in light of the
mandates required by the Geneva Phonograms Convention. In
any event, courts “should not just be dealing with the question
whether in any individual case it was possible to reproduce a
sample—they should as a matter of principle be concerned with
establishing which aesthetic standards should—and must—be
permitted in the production of music.”261
Similarly, with respect to the second free use exception, it
is still not clear from the succession of Kraftwerk opinions exactly what parts of a sound recording will be defined as “recognizable” melodies, and thus, immune from the defense. Will it
be relevant whether a general audience can recognize the
plaintiff’s melody as contained in the defendant’s work, or will
the same question have to be determined by expert musicologists? If a drum beat is particularly distinctive, is it nonetheless non-protectable simply because it is considered only a
rhythmic element and not part of the melody of the song?262
More complicated than that, what definition of recognizability
should the court apply when resolving this issue? Unfortunately, the Kraftwerk court’s original opinion provided many more
questions than answers to this important issue.
V. THE SOLUTION FOR THE UNITED STATES: A
MODIFICATION TO THE FAIR USE DEFENSE FOR
SAMPLES OF SOUND RECORDINGS
The main problem with the legal analyses of digital sampling is that the pundits representing either side of the issue
swing too broadly. The Bridgeport Music court’s analysis con261. Radišić, supra note 258.
262. See Demers, supra note 42, at 36. Joanna Demers, assistant professor
of music history and literature at the University of Southern California, takes
issue with the fact that copyright generally protects the melody and lyrics of a
song more than it does the secondary elements such as timbre, ornamentation,
and instrumentation. Id. at 32. Professor Demers notes that the “narrow description” of what constitutes a song in Western theory, which has influenced
copyright law, should be reformulated since “music resists classification as an
idea or expression because there is so little agreement as to the precise nature
of music.” Id.
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tains a strained reading of §114 to encompass the act of sampling when the legislative history is clear that the main purpose of the provision was to prevent unauthorized bootlegging,
which was determined by Congress in 1971 to have been depriving legitimate record and tape manufacturers of significant
income, as well as delimiting performers from substantial and
deserved royalties.263 Specifically, from an examination of the
legislative history of §114(b), it is likely that Congress only intended to resolve unauthorized copying of entire sound recordings as opposed to copying of only a sample of a recording.264
This was not an oversight of Congress; since the practice of
sampling did not exist, it simply was not considered in the
drafting of §114(b).265 Many correctly argue, therefore, that the
section simply does not apply to digital sampling if the original
work and the new work are not market substitutes—or bootlegs.266
On the other hand, those who criticize the Bridgeport Music court on this very point also miss the mark, when they insist that:
The distinction made in Section 114 between sound recordings and
other copyrighted works is that sound recording copyright owners’
rights are more limited than those of other copyright owners; the
statute does not state that the rights of sound recording owners are in
any way expanded beyond those of other copyright owners.267

Could it instead be the case, as intimated by both the
Bridgeport Music and Kraftwerk courts, that because sound recording owners do not generally enjoy rights of performance
that is precisely the reason why their rights to reproduce, dis263. H.R. Rep. No. 92–487, at 2 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1567 (“The attention of the Committee has been directed to the widespread
unauthorized reproduction of phonograph records and tapes. While it is difficult to establish the exact volume or dollar value of current piracy activity, it
is estimated by reliable trade sources that the annual volume of such piracy is
now in excess of $100 million.”); see also Mary Ann Lane, Note, “Interactive
Services” and the Future of Internet Radio Broadcasts, 62 ALA. L. REV. 459,
461 (2011) (the primary purpose of the 1971 amendments “was to guard
against the unauthorized duplication of sound recordings”).
264. H.R. Rep. No. 92–487, at 4.
265. See Bryan Bergman, Note, Into the Grey: The Unclear Laws of Digital
Sampling, 27 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 619, 644 (2005) (“Since sampling
was not a common practice when the Congress created the 1976 version of the
Copyright Act, no legislative guidance has been set and thus the music industry still faces this dilemma today.”).
266. E.g., Watson, supra note 20, at 480.
267. Osterberg, supra note 68, at 638.
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tribute, and make derivative works of the sounds they own
should be even more protected by not being subject to a de
minimis use defense?268
Because the answer to this question largely depends on information that can be provided only by musicians and other
music industry professionals, it is imperative that congressional hearings be scheduled to address this major gap in the laws
of both countries. Since a constitutional mandate has been provided to the legislatures of both the United States and Germany to define the scope of copyright protection for musical
works,269 it is incumbent upon both bodies of government to restructure the Copyright Act and the UrhG, respectively, in accordance with the modern principles of sampling law that continue to evade traditional doctrine. The only way to achieve this
goal is for the legislatures to consult musical experts “with particularly high standards” before determining the precise and
proper legal fences for samples.270 If the legislatures of both
countries can agree with the basic premise articulated by both
the courts in Bridgeport Music and Kraftwerk—as even many
samplers do—that taking even a small sample of a prior recording is taking something of value,271 some standard must be set
268. See Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films LLC, 410 F.3d 792, 800
(6th Cir. 2005) (holding that the balance struck in creating rights for sound
recordings under §114(b) “was to give sound recording copyright holders the
exclusive right ‘to duplicate the sound recording in the form of phonorecords or
copies that directly or indirectly recapture the actual sounds fixed in the recording’”) (emphasis added) (quoting 17 U.S.C. § 114(b) (2006)); Conley &
Braegelmann, supra note 8, at 1027 (discussing the Kraftwerk court’s analysis,
writing “[i]f only the unauthorized reproduction and distribution of the entire
phonogram were prohibited, the protection afforded the producer of phonograms would be largely ineffective. . . especially in light of modern digital recording, reproduction, and rendition technologies”).
269. See Geiger, supra note 190, at 539–40 (discussing the broad powers
granted to legislators in protecting copyrights under Article 14 of the German
Constitution); Amanda Webber, Note, Digital Sampling and the Legal Implications of its Use After Bridgeport, 22 ST. JOHN’S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 373, 386
(2007) (“As the Constitution firmly demonstrates, copyright law is a ‘creature
of statute’ and ‘it is Congress that has been assigned the task of defining the
scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted.’”) (quoting Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, Inc. 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).
270. See Radišić, supra note 258.
271. JOSEPH GLENN SCHLOSS, MAKING BEATS: THE ART OF SAMPLE-BASED
HIP-HOP 73 (2004). It appears that many samplers would agree. When asked
why one would go about the trouble of sampling, one sampler responded that
there is something in the sampling process itself that cannot be duplicated by
live instrumentation and that “[t]he reason why people sample is that you get
an instant vibe, and an instant sound . . . .” Id. at 3−4; see also, Kim, supra
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in order to assess exactly what that value is and how it can be
quantified.
Such an assessment is muddled by additional—and extremely contradictory—rules that have been set forth by samplers themselves, particularly in the hip-hop industry. Interestingly, among many hip-hop artists who claim that their artistry
will be hindered by having to pay for samples and who wish to
sample older artists’ material freely, there is a “self-evident”
rule that “[o]ne shouldn’t sample from another hip-hop record
because one would be exploiting the effort of the original producer who dug up the sound.”272 Producer King Otto explained
the rule, saying that “[i]t doesn’t take any work to sample from
a rap record, basically. Because it’s already there for you, it can
be sampled.”273 One copyright scholar has explained the phenomenon as follows:
Sampling from another hip hop record would also be exploiting that
previous effort. Hip hop producers also believe that building from another producer’s efforts is not sufficiently challenging, as they are not
doing the proper “digging” for the beat. The rule against “biting”
demonstrates the value of hard work and creativity among those in
the hip hop community. An artist who samples from a hip hop record
does not demonstrate either of these qualities because the record has
already been discovered and optimized for its “hip hop aesthetic.” This
is an interesting example of how the hip hop community’s own set of
ethics runs parallel to a common legal concept, and yet is based on a
different set of concerns.274

Another producer explains, “I would never sample something that was already sampled from somebody else. That just
seems like some weird type of incest or something. Just kind of
strange. I would definitely say that was a rule.”275 Ironically,
the rationale for this rule is basically the same reason why the
older artists object to sampling: it allows newcomers to readily
and easily take creations from previous musicians and producers who have uniquely achieved a distinctively recognizable

note 103 at 126 (“What is of value to the sampler is the unique nature of the
original recorded sounds and the creative choices that were made in the actual
fixation of the composition.”); John Schietinger, Comment, Bridgeport Music,
Inc. v. Dimension Films: How the Sixth Circuit Missed a Beat on Digital Music
Sampling, 55 DEPAUL L. REV. 209, 236 (2005) (noting that “re-recording cannot capture the same sound as the original recording”).
272. Schloss, supra note 271, at 114.
273. Id.
274. Webber, supra note 269, at 380–81.
275. Schloss, supra note 271, at 116.
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and desired sound in the first place. It is particularly interesting to point out that the Bridgeport Music court seemed to foresee such an entangled dilemma, which it astutely surmised
would haunt the music industry when it noted that “where one
stands [on the issue of sampling] depends on where one sits . . .
since in many instances, today’s sampler is tomorrow’s
samplee.”276
It is thus apparent that not only the courts, but also sampled and sampling musicians as well, are struggling with an attempt to put some fences around the ownership of sounds in
order to temper subsequent uses of those sounds which inherently seem to be fair or free. The problem lies in figuring out
the right type of fence. Many scholars fundamentally disagree
with the approach taken by the Bridgeport Music court by arguing that a de minimis defense is, in fact, appropriate in the
context of a digital sampling case.277 Some scholars maintain

276. Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Dimension Films LLC, 410 F.3d 792, 804
(6th Cir. 2005). Indeed, the court was not off the mark in this observation
since such a phenomenon had already arisen in 2001 when Marly Marl sued
Snoop Dogg for sampling his song in which he actually used samples of a different previous recording! Williams v. Broadus, No. 99 Civ. 10957 MBM, 2001
WL 984714 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 27, 2001).
277. See, e.g., Morrison, supra note 179, at 138 (“Where a substantial portion of the original work is taken it is more likely that the sample represents
an ‘organizing feature’ of the new work, or one which will immediately call the
original to the mind of the ordinary listener. From this perspective, samples
that contain a substantial portion of the original, under a quantitative analysis, are more likely to implicate the individual and social costs associated with
the derivative works paradigm. On the other hand, quantitatively insignificant samples are more likely to be countenanced under traditional substantial
similarity principles and the common law of de minimis use. Because these
samples are less likely to constitute an ‘organizing feature’ of the original work
and/or immediately call the original work to the mind of the ordinary listener,
they are less likely to implicate the individual and social costs of increased
freedom to recode sound recordings, and allowing their use would make room
for the social benefits of increased freedom to recode copyrighted sound recordings.”); see also Brandes, supra note 30, at 127 (suggesting that Bridgeport
Music’s prohibition of de minimis sampling contradicts the purpose of copyright law and overlooks the creative value in sampling rap music, and stating
that “[w]here listeners, even those familiar with the original work, cannot ascertain that a particular work has been sampled, it makes little sense to grant
absolute copyright protection to the copyright holders.”); Schietinger, supra
note 271, at 243 (positing that the Sixth Circuit should have followed the district court’s de minimis analysis and proposing the following three-part test
from an “ordinary observer perspective”: “(1) whether the sample constitutes a
trivial portion of the original song, (2) whether the sample is quantitatively
recognizable in the alleged infringing song, and (3) whether the two songs are
qualitatively similar.”).
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that it is time for the United States to expand its moral rights
protection in the Copyright Act to the realm of digital samples,
noting that a sampling defendant is engaged in a taking of the
original producer’s “authorial personality,”278 while others believe that some form of a compulsory license should be devised
for the secondary use of sound recordings and compositions.279
Still others go so far as claiming that copyright owners of sound
recordings performed by bands such as Led Zeppelin or Pink
Floyd, who routinely deny sampling licenses, must be required
by the law to produce “a compelling reason as a threshold requirement for denying the right.”280
The proper fence or parameter of sound recording ownership should ultimately be determined by assessing whether the
first recording is substantially recognizable to the average listener as it is appears in the second recording. A valid critique
of the Bridgeport Music case is that the portions of the plaintiff’s song that were sampled and appeared in the defendants’
song were barely recognizable and likely would not have been
detected even by the copyright owners of the sound recording
but for the fact that the defendants sought a license for the
composition.281 A similar objection can be made in the Newton
v. Diamond case in which the plaintiff sued on the composition
rights after the Beastie Boys had diligently sought a license for
use of the sound recording. In fact, the media have referred to
278. Troutt, supra note 76, at 386. Another author maintains that “creative
individuals” should be able to enforce their moral rights of attribution and integrity through copyright dilution and proposes the adaption of the provisions
of the Trademark Dilution Revision Act to the area of copyright law by creating a standard of copyright blurring, or “an association arising from copying by
a junior creative work of a senior creative work that impairs the distinctiveness of the senior creative work.” Lucille M. Ponte, Preserving Creativity from
Endless Digital Exploitation: Has the Time Come for the New Concept of Copyright Dilution?, 15 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 34, 94 (2009).
279. Ashtar, supra note 15, at 313; Webber, supra note 269, at 410 (advocating the application of “a combination compulsory licensing and fair use
scheme in digital sampling” cases).
280. Carl A. Falstrom, Comment, Thou Shalt Not Steal: Grand Upright
Music LTD. v. Warner Bros. Music, Inc. and the Future of Digital Sound Sampling in Popular Music, 45 HASTINGS L.J. 359, 376 (1994). The author provides
no opinion regarding what may be properly considered a “compelling” reason
for the denial of a sampling license. See id.
281. Brandes, supra note 30, at 127 (“Where listeners, even those familiar
with the original work, cannot ascertain that a particular work has been sampled, it makes little sense to grant absolute copyright protection to the copyright holders.”).
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Bridgeport Music, Inc. as a sample “troll” (akin to a patent
troll) that acquired the rights to several copyrights and subsequently “dug up” every single sample used by others “and sued
them all—filing hundreds of lawsuits.”282 While criticizing a legal entity for purchasing copyrights that are legally assignable
and transferable commodities in the United States and subsequently exercising its exclusive rights under the Copyright Act
is far from rational, a plausible argument does exist that, when
a sampler’s use of a prior sound recording is both transformative and substantially non-recognizable to the ordinary listener,
then a fair use exception to such use can be maintained.283
Other scholars and courts have argued that recognizability
of the plaintiff’s sounds in the song of the defendant should be a
factor that is taken into consideration in sampling cases; however, they have insisted that this issue be assessed as part of
the test of infringement or as a de minimis argument.284 Because sampling is a per se taking that is always intentional,
and since it evades the traditional qualitative/quantitative
analyses that can be applied to other categories of copyrighted
works, non-recognizability should be a defense to infringement
available to the defendant once the plaintiff has proved the
front door issue of whether a portion of his work was, in fact,
sampled by the defendant. As such, in drafting a modified version of §107 as applied to sampling cases, Congress should
modify the third fair use factor—the amount and substantiality
of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a
whole—when specifically applied to sampling cases. This third
fair use factor currently considers both the quality and quantity of the portions sampled by the defendant.285 However, since
analyses of the portion used by the defendant are not appropriate in sampling cases, because samplers who use even a small
amount of the original song loop the sample many times continuously throughout the new song, the language should be
changed to “the substantial recognizability of the portion used
282. George Clinton Takes on Sample Troll Bridgeport Music Again: The
DNA of Hip Hop Has Been Hijacked, TECHDIRT (June 13, 2011),
http://www.techdirt.com/articles/20110613/01234014665/george-clinton-takessample-troll-bridgeport-music-again-dna-hip-hop-has-been-hijacked.shtml.
283. Webber, supra note 269, at 407 (“If a sample is altered to the point
that the underlying work is no longer recognizable, then the sampled artist is
not injured.”).
284. See, e.g., Saregama India Ltd. v. Mosley, 635 F.3d 1284, 1338–39 (11th
Cir. 2011); Morrison, supra note 179 at 138.
285. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994).
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in defendant’s work to the ordinary listener.” In this way, new
musicians are able to use prior generic, i.e., nonrecognizable,
sounds as building blocks for the foundation of their new
works, while older artists are able to maintain the integrity,
cache, and market effect of their popular songs that are wellknown by audiences and associated with them.
CONCLUSION
We live in an exciting and eclectic musical era in which
new technology continues to enable the production of more and
different songs created by a more diverse group of people.
While intellectual property laws should continue to encourage
the development and use of such technology, they also must ensure the proper protection and fences that allow an adequate
amount of control by the original author. Whether or not “good
fences make good neighbors”286 in intellectual property jurisprudence involving third-party use of digital samples remains
to be seen. It appears from the Kraftwerk decision that—at
least according to Germany’s highest court—good fences do, indeed, make good neighboring rights. Similarly, in Bridgeport
Music, the only appellate court decision in the United States to
fully consider the legal boundaries of sound recordings in the
context of sampling, the court has attempted to advocate strict
parameters for such rights.
While both the Bridgeport Music and Kraftwerk courts arrived at clear and definable solutions regarding the question of
sound recording ownership and infringement, they ultimately
failed to delineate the proper scope of fair or free use to determine when such boundaries can be broken by sampling defendants in order to achieve the proper balance of protecting old
works and creating new ones. Since “there certainly are many
factors indeed that go into the making of a sound,”287 finding a
suitable compromise remains a challenge for both countries
and, until it is achieved, both owners and samplers of music
will remain subject to the perplexingly incomplete directives as
set forth in these opinions. A proper balance of the objectives of
both sampled and sampling musicians can best be achieved in
the United States by modifying the fair use defense to eliminate the quantitative/qualitative analysis and replace it with a
286. Frost supra note 1, at 33.
287. See Radišić, supra note 258.
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test regarding whether the plaintiff’s sound recording is substantially recognizable to the average listener as is appears in
the defendant’s song.

